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Abstract. Larger Indian firms selling inputs to other firms tend to have more cus-
tomers, tend to be used more intensively by their customers, and tend to have larger
customers. Motivated by these regularities, I propose a novel empirical model of
trade featuring endogenous formation of input-output linkages between spatially dis-
tant firms. The empirical model consists of (a) a theoretical framework that accom-
modates first order features of firm-to-firm network data, (b) a maximum likelihood
framework for structural estimation that is uninhibited by the scale of data, and (c) a
procedure for counterfactual analysis that speaks to the effects of micro- and macro-
shocks to the spatial network economy. In the model, firms with low production costs
end up larger because they find more customers, are used more intensively by their
customers and in turn their customers lower production costs and end up larger them-
selves. The model is estimated using novel micro-data on firm-to-firm sales between
Indian firms. The estimated model implies that a 10% decline in inter-state border
frictions in India leads to welfare gains ranging between 1% and 8% across districts.
Moreover, over half of the variation in changes in firms’ sales to other firms can be
explained by endogenous changes in the network structure.
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1. Introduction
Heterogeneity in production costs across firms is at the heart of modern general equi-
librium models of firm heterogeneity and trade. Yet differences in firms’ production
costs are typically attributed to differences in productivity across firms. With firms
operating in production networks, differences in production costs arise not just from
differences in productivity but also from finding the most cost-effective suppliers of in-
termediate inputs. While trade does not directly affect the former, trade in intermediate
inputs influences the latter. General equilibrium theories of trade with firms differing
only in productivity do not grapple with microscopic heterogeneity in the extensive
and intensive margins of firm-to-firm trade in intermediate inputs — who buys from
whom and how much? How does endogenous formation of customer-supplier linkages
between firms and the resultant network architecture drive differences in firms’ overall
sales, ability to sell across multiple destinations, and aggregate patterns of trade? How
do we evaluate the impact of market integration, technology improvements, and im-
provements in allocative efficiency on aggregate outcomes when the production network
of firms reorganizes in response to these shocks?
In this paper, I present a novel framework to evaluate the aggregate and firm-level
consequences of micro- and macro- shocks to the spatial economy and answer these
questions in four steps. First, I use novel micro-data to document empirical regularities
arising from a new decomposition of firms’ sales that underscores the salience of en-
dogenous network formation between firms. Second, I develop amodel of trade between
multiple locations featuring endogenous formation of firm-to-firm production networks
that not only rationalizes micro-data on firm-to-firm sales but is also consistent with
structural gravity at the aggregate level. Third, I devise a procedure to structurally
estimate the model that circumvents computational difficulties pervasive in estimation
of network formation models with large numbers of firms. Fourth, I propose a pro-
cedure to evaluate counterfactual outcomes that accounts for randomness in network
formation without requiring simulation of large networks which can be computationally
burdensome due to interdependence in link formation.
Using data on 103 million firm-to-firm relationships assembled from administrative
VAT records spanning across 5 years and pertaining to around 2.5 million Indian firms
located across 141 districts, I find that firms with higher sales to other firms (a) tend
to have more customers, (b) tend to be used more intensively by their customers and
(c) tend to sell to larger customers. The first margin explains 35% of the variation in
firms’ sales, an additional 46% is explained by the second margin, leaving 19% for the
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third. On one hand, the third margin suggests that firms’ heterogeneity in input sales is
partially driven by demand from larger customers downstream in the supply chain. On
the other hand, the first and the second margins suggest that firms’ choice of suppliers
and the intensity with which to use their goods potentially influences the attractiveness
of the firm as a supplier to its own potential customers. While the former points to
the role of network linkages in driving differences between firms, the latter highlights
the role of endogenous formation of firm-to-firm linkages in it, both along the extensive
and intensive margins. Theseregularities suggestthat endogenous network formation is
pertinent to understanding the origins of firm heterogeneity.
The starting point of the theory is the Ricardian model of trade between multiple lo-
cations with geographic barriers and imperfect competition as in Bernard et al. (2003).
I depart from their framework by accommodating heterogeneous consumer preferences,
heterogeneous technological requirements by firms, and arbitrary production networks
between firms.1 Firms’ production processes consist of multiple input requirements.
Potential suppliers differ in the suitability of their goods for each of these requirements.
Firms randomly encounter potential suppliers and select the most cost-effective suppli-
ers for their production requirements. When selecting their suppliers, firms are more
likely to select (and for a larger proportion of their requirements) a potential supplier
that is able to sell at a lower price and produces a good that is more suitable for its
production requirements.
The ability of a potential supplier to sell at a lower price than another is regulated
by (a) its idiosyncratic productivity, (b) the efficiency with which its own suppliers
were able to produce thus affording the firm a lower price for intermediate inputs, and
(c) proximity to location of use thus having to incur lower geographic costs. Firms
with lower production costs thus not only attract more customers but are also used
more intensively in their customers’ production processes. Since these customers use
cheaper inputs, they end up with lower production costs themselves and become cost-
effective suppliers to their customers. In the cross-section, firms with low production
costs end up larger because they have more customers, are used more intensively by
their customers and have larger customers.
Differences in the suitability of potential suppliers’ goods for a firm’s production
requirements feature as match-specific productivities across firm pairs in a manner
similar to the discrete choice framework. This leads to a multinomial logit model of
1While Caliendo and Parro (2014) allow for sectoral heterogeneity and intersectoral linkages in a Ricar-
dian model of trade, they do not allow for arbitrary production networks between firms and are unable
to accommodate the vast heterogeneity in input sourcing patterns at the firm-level observed in data.
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supplier choice for each of the firm’s production requirements. The estimation equation
recognizes that while there is a positive probability of a firm sourcing inputs from every
other firm, sourcing inputs for only a discrete number of requirements can give rise to
sparsity in firm-to-firm connections. This sparsity can be extreme as is observed in
the data where the number of firm-to-firm connections are many orders of magnitude
lower than its potential given the number of firms in the economy. Predictions for inter-
firm trade then allow estimation of the model utilizing the full volume of micro-data
on firm-to-firm transactions via the method of maximum likelihood. Semi-parametric
estimation of the model implies that firms’ fixed effects serve as sufficient statistics
for their implied marginal costs and bilateral inter-district fixed effects as a structural
gravity specification for estimating trade frictions. Such estimation programs typically
entail a high-dimensional non-linear optimization problem that quickly becomes cum-
bersome with large numbers of fixed effects. On the contrary, I show that these fixed
effects can be computed in closed-form thus avoiding the problem altogether.
For counterfactual analysis, I propose a procedure that departs from the exact hat
algebra approach commonly used in trade models (see Dekle et al. (2008) and Costinot
and Rodríguez-Clare (2014)). In aggregate models of trade, the exact hat algebra ap-
proach evaluates the change in aggregate outcomes in response to shocks. In those
models, aggregate data coincides with the expected value of aggregate outcomes in the
initial state. In contrast, my model accommodates granularity and acknowledges that
the observed data corresponds to only one ofmany possible realizations under the initial
state. The data generating process implied by the model is therefore non-degenerate
and hat algebra cannot be used as is. To evaluate counterfactual outcomes, I therefore
use the model to obtain the expected value of the data generating process in the initial
state and use hat algebra to evaluate the expected value in the counterfactual state.
The model and the procedure are rich enough to not only speak about aggregate effects
of aggregate shocks but also firm-level effects of aggregate shocks and aggregate and
firm-level effects of micro-shocks.
Using the estimatedmodel, I conduct three counterfactual experiments. First, I eval-
uate the consequences of reducing inter-state border frictions in the context of the recent
Goods and Services Tax reform in India that aimed to mitigate such barriers to trade. I
find that a 10% decline in border frictions leads to sizable welfare gains across districts
ranging between 1% and 8%. Moreover, over half of the variation in changes in firms’
sales to other firms can be explained by endogenous changes in the network structure.
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Second, I examine firm-level implications of a uniform decline in trade frictions.
Firms’ sales to other firms adjust along two margins. On one hand, firms become either
more or less successful in attracting more customers or increasing market share among
existing ones. On the other hand, change in customers (or market shares within them)
affects the average customer size for these firms. For firms in the top five percentiles,
the negative adjustment along the second margin dominates positive adjustment along
the first — their sales to other firms shrink. For the rest of the firms, sales to other
firms expands. For firms in the next five percentiles, the positive adjustment along
the first margin dominates the negative adjustment along the second. The remaining
firms above the third quartile face positive adjustment along both margins. For firms
below the third quartile, the positive adjustment along the second margin dominates
the negative adjustment along the first.
Third, policy reforms can sometimesmanifest as heterogeneousmicroeconomic shocks
across firms. To illustrate the effects of micro-shocks on aggregate outcomes through
the lens of the model, I evaluate the consequences of neutralizing firm-level distortions
when they correlate positively versus negatively with size. I find that in either case en-
dogenous changes in the network structure explain a dominant majority of changes in
firms’ sales to other firms. At the aggregate level, neutralizing positively size-dependent
distortions has positive terms of trade effects for a majority of districts whereas neu-
tralizing negatively size-dependent distortions has negative terms of trade effects for a
majority of districts.
Related Literature. This paper contributes to four strands of literature. First, this
paper is related to the nascent literature on endogenous production networks in gen-
eral equilibrium which can be broadly classified into two categories. The first (Eaton
et al. (2016);Oberfield (2018);Acemoglu andAzar (2020); BoehmandOberfield (2020))
models formation of linkages as the outcome of selection from a discrete menu of choices
whereas the second (Lim (2017); Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017); Huneeus (2018)) mod-
els formation of linkages between firms as the outcome of “love of variety” in input
sourcing while being subject to relationship costs.2 This paper is more closely related
to the former to take advantage of extreme value functional forms that allow tractable
empirical characterization for estimation. While this paper shares the mechanism for
supplier selection with Oberfield (2018) and Boehm and Oberfield (2020) and formu-
lation of technology and preferences with Eaton et al. (2016), none of these papers
2Other complementary approaches to endogenous production network formation include Carvalho
and Voigtlander (2014), Chaney (2014), Tintelnot et al. (2018) and Antràs and de Gortari (2020).
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provide a closed-form characterization of both the extensive and intensive margins of
inter-firm trade that the model here delivers. While Oberfield (2018) and Boehm and
Oberfield (2020) do not consider trade between locations, the model in Eaton et al.
(2016) features trade. In contrast to Eaton et al. (2016), where there are no differences
in suitability of goods across firms’ requirements and estimation of the model requires
use of simulation-basedmethods, themodel here uniquely recognizes the fact that firms’
input sourcing decisions comprise finding the supplier that not only offers the lowest
price but is also the most suitable for production requirements. The extreme value
formulation of this feature delivers a multinomial logit model of supplier choice and
allows the model to be estimated directly using the full volume of data on firm-to-firm
sales via maximum likelihood.
Second, this paper is related to a long literature on firm heterogeneity (for example,
Jovanovic (1982); Hopenhayn (1992); Axtell (2001); Melitz (2003); Klette and Kortum
(2004); Luttmer (2007); Arkolakis (2016)) and in particular the branch that studies
the heterogeneity among firms arising from their engagement in input-output linkages
— Oberfield (2018) and Bernard et al. (2019). The model here houses two sources of
firm heterogeneity — from idiosyncratic productivities as in Kortum (1997) and from
match-specific productivities and engagement in input-output linkages as in Oberfield
(2018). Unlike Oberfield (2018), the model accommodates heterogeneity in the number
of input suppliers across firms as well as in the intensity of use of suppliers across their
customers. The model thus allows for variation in firms’ average intensity of use by
their customers. In the data, this margin explains 46% of the variation in firms’ sales.
The modeling approach here is distinct from Bernard et al. (2019) who use a fixed cost
formulation that necessitates use of simulation-based estimation methods.
Third, the paper also relates to a growing literature on propagation of shocks and
aggregation in distorted production networks including Jones (2011), Acemoglu et al.
(2012), Swiecki (2017), Caliendo et al. (2017), Liu (2019), Baqaee and Farhi (2019a,b,
2020), and Bigio and LaO (2020). Some of these papers allow for non-Cobb–Douglas
technologies and thus endogenize the intensity with which different inputs are used.
However, they do not investigate which combinations of inputs will be used—that is,
the extensive margin of firm-to-firm trade —which features prominently in this paper.
Finally, this paper is related to a rich literature in international trade. In the model,
trade is driven by comparative advantage as in Ricardian trade models (Eaton and
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Kortum (2002); Bernard et al. (2003)). However, since the model accommodates het-
erogeneity in consumer preferences and technological requirements across firms, com-
parative advantage is determined by each consumer and firm demanding inputs rather
than at the level of each market. This allows the model to rationalize patterns of firm
participation in international trade within the Ricardian framework which are typically
relegated to new trade theory models such as Melitz (2003) and Eaton et al. (2011).3
This paper is also related to the branch of the trade literature that develops firm-level
models of importing that accommodate heterogeneity in input sourcing behavior be-
tween firms (for example, Antràs et al. (2017); Blaum et al. (2018)). While these papers
consider models where firms choose the set of locations to source intermediate inputs or
the share of intermediate inputs that are imported, here I develop a more disaggregated
model where firms choose both the set of suppliers across multiple locations for interme-
diate inputs and the share purchased from each of them. The model also shares features
with papers that emphasize the role of granularity in trade models such as Eaton et al.
(2013), Armenter andKoren (2014), andGaubert and Itskhoki (2021). The approach to
counterfactual analysis parallels contemporaneous work byDingel andTintelnot (2020)
who take a related approach in commuting choice models that feature granularity. 4
Outline. Section 2 describes the data and the corresponding empirical regularities.
Section 3 describes the model and lays out the probabilistic assumptions under which
model predictions on inter-firm trade shares are derived. Section 4 begins with the
estimation framework for firms’ marginal costs, trade frictions and dispersion of firms’
raw efficiencies. It then provides the procedure for conducting counterfactual analy-
sis. Section 5 examines model implications for counterfactual scenarios, one that leads
to improvements in allocative efficiency and another that causes market integration.
Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the Online Appendix.
Notation. Throughout the paper, a firm is indexed by s when it is a seller of interme-
diate inputs or goods for final consumption and by b when it is a buyer of intermediate
3For example, Eaton et al. (2011) state that the Ricardian framework with a fixed range of commodities
used in Bernard et al. (2003) does not deliver the feature that a larger market attracts more firms as
observed in French data.
4In their case, non-degeneracy of counterfactual outcomes arises from a finite number of individuals
making residential and workplace decisions. In this paper, non-degeneracy of counterfactual outcomes
arises from interdependent decisions on input sourcing made by a finite number of firms. A similar
problem of indeterminacy of the trade equilibrium in relative wages across locations arises in both
cases. While they introduce the notion of continuum-case rational expectations to resolve this issue,
I show that relative wages are deterministic under a large network approximation despite granularity
at firm-level.
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inputs. Households are indexed by i. A location is indexed by o when it is the origin
of a trade flow and typically where firm s is located. Similarly, it is indexed by d when
it is the destination of a trade flow and typically where firm b is located or household i
resides. The set of all locations is denoted by J . The set of all firms is denoted byM
and the subset located at o is denoted byMo. The set of all households is denoted by
L and the subset located at d is denoted by Ld. The number of elements in these sets
are denoted asM= |M|, L= |L|,Mo= |Mo|, and Ld= |Ld|.
2. Data & Empirical Regularities
2.1. Sources of Data. The primary dataset for this paper consists of the universe
of intra-state firm-to-firm transactions assembled from commercial tax authorities of
five Indian states (viz. Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Odisha, and West Bengal)
between 2011-12 and 2015-16. Put together, these states had a nominal GDP of $738
billion in 2015-16, accounting for nearly 40% of national GDP. Among these states, the
largest (Maharashtra) accounts for roughly 14% of national GDP while the smallest
(Odisha) accounts for a little over 2%. I complement this dataset with data on the
universe of inter-state firm-to-firm transactions obtained from the Ministry of Finance
in the Government of India running for the same period. It includes transactions be-
tween all firms registered under the value-added tax system in their respective state.
The combined dataset consists of transactions between goods-producing firms and does
not include the services sector. It records 103 million inter-firm relationships between
approximately 2.5 million firms across the years. Firms are located across 141 districts
in these 5 states. 5
2.2. Network Margins of Firm Heterogeneity & Trade. Indian firms are vastly
heterogeneous in size, a pervasive finding in studies of firm-level data. Intuitively, firms’
outcomes are shaped not only by their own intrinsic characteristics, like productivity,
but also by the characteristics of the firms – suppliers and customers – that they connect
with. In this paper, I am concerned with firm heterogeneity arising from their behavior
in production networks along two margins — the upstream and the downstream mar-
gins. On one hand, firm behavior on the upstream margin — its decision of supplier
choice on the extensive and intensive margins affects not only its own marginal cost
but potentially that of customers that purchase goods from it. On the other hand,
firm behavior on the downstream margin – its decision of quantity to produce and sell
to customers affects its suppliers through demand for inputs from them. While the
5See Appendix D.1 for summary statistics.
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downstream margin is operational in models with exogenous production networks, the
upstream margin requires a model of endogenous network formation between firms —
one where firms choose their suppliers and the intensity with which they use inputs
from those suppliers.
To shed light on the economic importance of these margins and guide the main fea-
tures of the model I will develop in Section 3, I leverage the rich network structure of
the dataset to conduct a simple decomposition of firms’ sales to other firms into three
margins: number of customers, average intensity of use among those customers, and
average customer size. Formally, input sales of firm s located at o can be decomposed

















In this expression,No(s) is the number of customers and πod(s,b) is the intensity with





where salesod(s,b)denotes the value of goods sold by firm s to firm b and input costsd(b)=∑
o
∑
s∈Mosalesod(s,b). Through variation in number of customers, the first factor cap-
tures the attractiveness of the firm to potential customers looking for input suppliers.
Similarly through variation in intensity of use by customers, the second factor captures
the attractiveness of the firm on the intensive margin of input choice by its customers.
The third factor measures average size of customers as inferred from a weighted average
of their input costs. The first two factors constitute the upstream margin and capture
the direct importance of the firm in the production network since it captures how cost-
effective the firm is irrespective of the characteristics of the customers it sells to. The
third factor constitutes the downstream margin and captures the indirect importance
of the firm in the production network through the importance of its customers, its
customers’ customers and so on. In addition, the upstream margin of firm’s sales also
captures the overall intensity of use of the firm — the sum of cost shares of all firms in
the economy that can be attributed purchases from it.6
6The upstream margin is sometimes referred to as the firm’s weighted out-degree. In recent work,
Acemoglu et al. (2012) coin this term for similar statistics at the industry level.
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I compute the share of variance of firms’ sales that is explained by each of these fac-
tors.7 Column (1) in Table 2.1 reports the results of the decomposition. Four-fifths of
the variance in firms’ sales can be attributed to the upstreammargin leaving the rest for
the downstream margin. It implies that larger firms are likely to have more customers
(explains 35% of the variance), be used more intensively by those customers (46%), and
have larger customers (19%). All three factors covary positively with sales and con-
tribute a non-trivial share to the variance. The positive covariance of the downstream
margin can be rationalized as follows. Firms with higher demand for their own goods
produce larger quantities and to do so they purchase higher quantities of inputs from
their suppliers. In turn, their suppliers end up with higher demand and they source
larger quantities from their own suppliers and so on. Therefore, in the cross-section
one observes that larger firms have larger customers on average. This points to the
importance of supply chain linkages between firms even when the network structure is
exogenously fixed.
However, it is the outsized contribution of the upstream margin that highlights the
importance of endogenous network formation through two potential channels. First,
when firms choose to source frommore cost-effective suppliers, they are likely to inherit
lower marginal costs from their suppliers. This makes them attractive to their own cus-
tomers who become larger in turn. Therefore, in the cross-section one would observe a
positive correlation between firms’ sales and number of customers. This suggests that
the endogeneity of production networks along the extensive margin of inter-firm trade
is important. Second, when suppliers’ goods are substitutable in a firms’ input demand
system, more cost-effective firms will account for a larger share of material costs of their
customers. Since those customers source cheaper inputs intensively, they are likely to
inherit lower marginal costs from their suppliers. This makes them attractive to their
own customers and they become larger themselves. Therefore, in the cross-section one
would observe a positive correlation between firms’ sales and average intensity of use
by customers. This suggests that the endogeneity of production networks along the
intensive margin of inter-firm trade is important.
7In short, if a variable X can be decomposed into R factors, {Xr}Rr=1 such that X = X1 ·X2 ···XR,
then the share of variance of X that can be attributed to any factor Xr is
Cov(lnX,lnXr)
V ar[lnX] . While these
shares sum to unity by additivity of the covariance operator, they are not constrained to be positive
individually. For example, see Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare (1997) for use in growth accounting and
Eaton et al. (2011) for regression-based decomposition of margins of trade.
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Table 2.1. Network Margins of Firm Heterogeneity & Trade
(1) (2) (3)
# Customers 35% 37% 67%
Intensity per Customer 46% 57% 20%
Average Customer Size 19% 6% 13%
Fixed Effects:
Seller×Year — X —
Origin×Year — — X
Data Level:
Seller×Year • — —
Seller×Destination×Year — • —
Origin×Destination×Year — — •
# observations 5.6×106 18.2×106 58,390
Note. Column (1) reports the contribution of factors: # customers, intensity per
customer, and average customer size, to the variance of firms’ sales (as per equation
(2.1)). Column (2) reports the contribution of those factors to the variance of firms’
destination-specific sales (as per equation (A.1)). Column (3) reports the same for
trade flows between districts (as per equation (A.2)). See Appendix A for details
and alternative specifications.
Furthermore, trade across space is costly and economic activity across space exhibits
large dispersion. How does the relative position of firms across space affect their out-
comes? How does geography affect the aforementioned margins of firm heterogeneity?
To investigate this, I construct a similar decomposition at amore disaggregated level for
firms’ destination-specific sales and at a more aggregated level for trade flows between
districts.8 Column (2) in Table 2.1 reports results of variance decomposition of firm’s
destination-specific sales while controlling for firm-level fixed effects. This is done to
capture the variation in individual firms’ sales across multiple destinations. The up-
streammargin accounts for 94% of the variation leaving 6% for the downstreammargin.
Column (3) in Table 2.1 reports results of variance decomposition of aggregate trade
flows between districts while controlling for origin fixed effects. The upstream margin
accounts for 87% of the variation leaving 13% for the downstream margin. Since the
upstream margin explains the lion’s share of the variation in both cases, these results
underscore the salience of geography in endogenous network formation between firms.
Taking stock, I find that firms that are larger also tend to have more customers, tend
to be used more intensively by their customers, and tend to have larger customers.
8Further details are provided in Appendix A.
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Of course, these decompositions capture equilibrium relationships and are not causal;
nevertheless, they make clear that understanding the characteristics of firms’ network
is key to understanding origins of firm heterogeneity. While the economic intuition
behind these results is straightforward, the decomposition results are, to the best of my
knowledge, new to the literature.9 With this in mind, I develop a model of endogenous
production network formation in the next section that expressly takes these findings
into account and leads to a multinomial logit model of supplier choice for estimation.
3. Theoretical Framework
In this section, I first describe amodel of trade betweenmultiple locations that accom-
modates heterogeneity in consumer preferences, heterogeneity in technological require-
ments of firms and arbitrary production networks. Subsequently, I employ functional
form assumptions that make the model tractable and allow to derive aggregate impli-
cations before proceeding to describe the framework for estimation in the next section.
3.1. Economic Environment. The model economy E ≡{M,L,J } consists of many
firms and households at many locations. Firms produce using local labor and interme-
diate inputs sourced from suppliers potentially spread across multiple locations. Each
household supplies one unit of labor inelastically to local firms. Firms rebate any profits
to local households. Trade between locations is subject to iceberg trade costs denoted
by τod≥1. That is, a firm producing at o needs to ship τod units of a good for one unit
of good to arrive at d.
3.1.1. Technology and Market Structure. Firms’ production processes involve combin-
ing labor and accomplishing a set of tasks. To accomplish tasks, firms source in-
termediate inputs from other firms. In particular, the production function for any












9In relatedwork, Huneeus (2018) andBernard et al. (2019) useChilean andBelgian production network
micro-data respectively to decompose firms’ sales to other firms into # customers and sales per cus-
tomer. At the aggregate level using trade flows, it is also related to the decomposition into extensive and
intensive margins of trade such as in Eaton et al. (2011, 2016) and Fernandes et al. (2018). Here, I show
that sales per customer in the former and the intensive margin in the latter can be further decomposed






where ld(b) is the amount of labor input used by firm b,md(b,k) is the quantity of mate-
rials utilized to accomplish task k, zd(b) is the idiosyncratic Hicks-neutral productivity
with which firm b produces, and Kd(b) is the number of tasks in firm b’s production
function.
Materials sourcing is subject to search frictions. Among all the firms in the economy,
firm b encounters only a few and can source intermediate inputs to accomplish tasks
only from those firms. This restricted set of potential suppliers is denoted by Sd(b).
While outputs of potential suppliers are perfectly substitutable for accomplishing any
task, they differ in their suitability for the task in question, captured by their respective
match-specific productivities. For each of its tasks, firm b selects the supplier that offers
the lowest effective price. Importantly, firm b may choose the same supplier for more
than one tasks.
The market structure for intermediate inputs and final consumption is characterized
by Bertrand competition. Firms face limit pricing behavior when sourcing intermediate
inputs and engage in limit pricing themselves when supplying their goods for interme-
diate input use by other firms and for final consumption by households. This means
that the lowest cost supplier for a firm or household sets a limit price to just undercut
the next lowest cost supplier available to the firm for intermediate input use or to the
household for final consumption.
I now turn to firms’ cost minimization problem. For firm b, selecting the cost-
minimizing input bundle consists of first selecting the most cost-effective supplier for
each task among the set of potential suppliers, then choosing the quantity of inputs to
purchase from those selected suppliers for each of the tasks and the amount of labor to
hire. In other words, firm b first chooses who to source inputs from and then how much
to buy from each of them.
For any particular task k in firm b’s production function, the cost-effectiveness of
a supplier s from location o in Sd(b) depends on four factors: (a) the marginal cost
of s, denoted co(s); (b) the trade cost faced by s of shipping goods to d, τod; (c) the
match-specific productivity when b utilizes the output of s to accomplish the task, de-
noted by aod(s,b,k), and (d) the markup charged by s when it sells its output to b for
accomplishing the task, denoted m̄od(s,b,k). For task k, firm b chooses the supplier that
13








Firms spend equal shares of costs across tasks. Although the elasticity of substitution
between tasks is equal to unity, this formulation captures richer patterns of substitu-
tion across outputs of other firms that are used to accomplish tasks. This is because a
potential supplier charging a lower price is likely to be selected for a higher number of
tasks by any firm and hence is likely to account for a higher cost share of the firm. The
extensive margin of firms’ input sourcing is determined by whether a potential supplier
is chosen for at least one of the tasks whereas the intensive margin is determined by how
many tasks the potential supplier gets selected for. Both these margins of inter-firm
trade are determined endogenously in equilibrium. 10
With limit pricing, the markup is determined by how much lower the effective cost
faced by the best supplier is relative to the second best. Hence, the effective price faced








Now, taking wage wd and effective prices {pd(b,k) :k∈Kd(b)} as given, the firm’s unit

















10In Eaton et al. (2016), the sets of potential suppliers for each task are exclusive (i.e., there are no
suppliers in common across these sets). As a result, a supplier is selected for at most one task by the
buyer and the number of tasks for which a supplier is selected is the same as the number of buyers. In
contrast, here, the set of potential suppliers is common across all tasks. As a result, a supplier can be
selected for more than one task by the buyer and the number of tasks for which a supplier is selected
can potentially be higher than the number of buyers. While in Eaton et al. (2016), the number of
suppliers is exogenously fixed (conditional in labor share) by the number of tasks, here the number of
suppliers is determined endogenously.
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where mod(s,b,k) denotes the quantity of goods sold by firm s to customer b for task k
and qod(s,i,n) denotes the quantity of goods sold by firm s to households i for need n
(described below). The quantity of goods sold mod(s,b,k) or qod(s,i,n) is positive if s is
the most effective supplier for task k or need n respectively and zero otherwise.
3.1.2. Household Preferences. Households consume goods produced by firms to fulfill
a set of needs. In particular, the utility function for any household i at location d is










where qd(i,n) is the quantity of goods consumed to fulfill need n andNd(i) is the number
of needs in the utility function.
Goods sourcing is subject to search frictions and is modeled similar to firms sourcing
inputs. Outputs of potential suppliers are perfectly substitutable for fulfilling any need
but differ in match-specific taste shocks. For each of its needs, household i selects the
supplier that offers the lowest effective price and can sometimes select the same supplier
for more than one needs. For household i, selecting the utility-maximizing consumption
bundle comprises of first selecting the most cost-effective supplier for each need among
the set of potential suppliers and then of choosing the quantity of goods to purchase
from those selected suppliers for each of the needs. For any particular need n in i’s
utility function, the cost-effectiveness of a supplier s from location o in Sd(i) depends
on four factors similar to those that affect firms sourcing inputs. In particular, for need









The markup is again determined by how much lower the effective cost faced by the
best supplier is relative to the second best. The effective price faced by i for need n








Now, taking {pd(i,n) :n∈Nd(i)} as given, the household’s indirect utility function
















is the per capita profit rebated to households residing at o.
3.1.3. Equilibrium Definition and Characterization. Let σ≡{z,K,N ,τ ,S,a} denote
the aggregate state of the economy. Here z denotes the vector of idiosyncratic produc-
tivities of firms,K denotes the numbers of tasks of all firms,N denotes the numbers of
needs of all households, τ denotes the vector of trade costs across all pairs of locations,
S denotes the sets of potential suppliers of all firms and households, and a denotes the
vector of all match-specific productivities and match-specific taste shocks. All of these
objects are exogenous.
An allocation in this economy is represented as ξ ≡ {l(σ),m(σ),q(σ),y(σ)} and is
defined as a set of functions,
l(σ)≡{ld(b;σ) :b∈Md,d∈J },
m(σ)≡{mod(s,b,k;σ) :k∈Kd(b),(s,b)∈Mo×Md,(o,d)∈J ×J },
q(σ)≡{qod(s,i,n;σ) :n∈Nd(i),(s,i)∈Mo×Ld,(o,d)∈J ×J },
y(σ)≡{yo(s;σ) :s∈Ms,o∈J },
that map the realization of the state to intermediate input and labor quantities, quanti-
ties consumedandquantities produced. Aprice system is represented as %≡{c(σ),p(σ),w(σ)}
and is defined as a set of functions,
c(σ)≡{co(s;σ) :s∈Mo,o∈J },
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p(σ)≡{pd(i,n;σ) :n∈Nd(i),i∈Ld,d∈J }∪{pd(b,k;σ) :k∈Kd(b),b∈Md,d∈J },
w(σ)≡{wd(σ) :d∈J },
that map the realization of the state to tasks’ prices for firms, needs’ prices for house-
holds, wage at each location and marginal costs of firms. This leads to the definition of
equilibrium in this economy as follows.
Definition 1. For any given state σ, an equilibrium in this economy is defined as an
allocation and price system, (ξ,%) such that (a) households select suppliers for needs
and firms select suppliers for tasks according to equations (3.1) and (3.4) respectively;
(b) firms set prices for other firms and households according to equations (3.2) and (3.5)
respectively; (c) householdsmaximize utility according to equation (3.6); (d) firmsmin-
imize costs according to equation (3.3); and (e) market clears for each firm’s goods and


















This completes description of the economic environment in themodel. Moving ahead,
the aggregate state can be divided into two parts. The first comprises of firms’ produc-
tivities, firms’ numbers of tasks, households’ numbers of needs, and trade costs; this is
denoted by σ0≡{z,K,N ,τ}. The second part comprises of sets of potential suppliers
for firms and households and match-specific productivities and taste shocks; this is de-
noted by σ1≡{S,a}. While σ0 narrows down the set of networks that could be realized
as an outcome of the network formation process, σ1 pinpoints the exact network of firms
that is realized. In the following subsections, I specify a probabilistic model so as to
characterize the aggregate trade equilibrium between locations for any given σ0.
3.2. Probabilistic Model. The probabilistic model is specified in three parts. First,
I state distributional assumptions on firms’ productivities, firms’ numbers of tasks, and
households’ numbers of needs. This reduces the dimensionality of the firm-level state
variables z andK and household-level state variablesN so that they are characterized
by parameters at the location level. Second, I describe the stochastic assumptions that
govern random encounters with potential suppliers and the choice of suppliers thereof.
This specifies the distribution of the numbers of potential suppliers available to each
17
firm and each household (S) and that of the match-specific productivities and match-
specific taste shocks associated with those suppliers (a). Finally, I characterize the
large economy limit of the model that enables aggregation and leads to the definition
of the aggregate trade equilibrium.
Firms’ productivities are drawn independently fromFréchet distributions parametrized
such that the mean and dispersion across firms vary by location and are given by the
following assumption.
Assumption 1. Idiosyncratic ex ante productivities {zo(s) :s∈Mo} are drawn inde-




where To and θo are respectively the scale and shape parameters of the productivity dis-
tribution at location o.
For any location o, the average productivity of firms is determined by To and dis-
persion in productivities is determined by θo. A higher To implies higher average pro-
ductivity and a higher θo implies lower dispersion in productivities. Firms’ numbers of
tasks and households’ numbers of needs are drawn from zero-truncated Poisson distri-
butions such that all firms have at least one task in their production function and all
households have at least one need in their utility function.
Assumption 2. The number of tasks {Kd(b) :b∈Md} are drawn independently ac-





The number of needs {Nd(i) : i∈Ld} are drawn independently according to the follow-





Thedistributions of the number of tasks across locations is parametrized such that the
intensity κd varies by location. A higher κd implies that firms at d have a larger number
of tasks on average and hence the potential to source inputs from a larger number of sup-
pliers. A similar explanation holds for how households’ number of needs depends on ηd.
Next, I turn to stochastic assumptions that govern random encounters with poten-
tial suppliers and the choice of suppliers thereof. Search frictions in the model are
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characterized by firms and households encountering potential suppliers via indepen-
dent Bernoulli trials. The set of sets of potential suppliers S is therefore completely
determined as the outcome of these Bernoulli trials for meeting each firm. The success
probabilities associated with these trials are given by the following assumption.





where λ>0. Similarly, the probability with which household i encounters firm s is also
given by P(s∈Sd(i))=λ/M.
These success probabilities are decreasing in the total number of firms in the economy.
In economies with sufficiently large number of firms, these search frictions approximate
Poisson processes where firms and households encounter potential suppliers with rate λ
for their tasks and needs respectively.11 Match-specific productivities and taste shocks
are drawn independently for all potential suppliers for each of the tasks in firms’ pro-
duction functions and needs in households’ utility functions from a Pareto distribution.
Assumption 4. Match-specific productivities and taste shocks a are drawn indepen-






with ζ <θo∀o∈J .
The shape parameter of this distribution ζ regulates the thickness of the right tails
of the match-specific productivity and taste shock distributions. The lower ζ is, the
higher is the likelihood of particularly high draws ofmatch-specific productivities. With
higher likelihood of high draws, the choice of supplier (according to equations 3.1 and
3.4) is less sensitive to marginal cost of the supplier or trade costs. The restriction that
ζ < θo for all locations implies that the likelihood of very high draws of idiosyncratic
productivities is less than that of very high match-specific productivities. This ensures
that the price index is well-defined in the limiting economy.
To enable the theoretical model to make aggregate predictions, I consider a limit-
ing economy where firms and households are arranged on a continuum. In the limiting
economy, the trade equilibrium conditional on σ0 which is characterized by wages across
locations {wd :d∈J }, is deterministic. Thus, there is no aggregate uncertainty at any










)M−Sd . For sufficiently large values ofM , |Sd(b)|∼Poisson(λ).
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location in the limiting economy. In particular, I adopt the large economy model due
to Al-Najjar (2004) which is characterized by a sequence of finite but increasingly large
economies that progressively discretizes the unit continuum. The distribution of firms
and households along the sequence is uniform. This allows use of the law of large num-
bers in the limiting continuum to derive cross-sectional distributions of effective prices
and marginal costs for given wages. While effective prices of firms’ tasks and marginal
costs of firms might individually vary across realizations of σ1, their cross-sectional
distributions at each location are invariant across all such realizations in the limiting
economy. The following definition formalizes the notion of the limiting economy in the
context of this paper.
Definition 2. Consider a sequence of finite economies {Et : t∈N}whereEt≡{Mt,Lt,Jt}
is such that the tth economy has the formMt={m1,···,mMt}⊂ [0,1] , Lt={`1,···,`Lt}⊂








L0t ⊂Lt. Then, {Et : t∈N} is a discretizing sequence of economies if it satisfies:
(1) Mt⊂Mt+1 and Lt⊂Lt+1 for all t,
(2) limt→∞UMt (Mt∩[al,ah])=U([al,ah]),
(3) limt→∞ULt (Lt∩[al,ah])=U([al,ah]),
where U(•) denotes the uniform distribution with support over [0,1] and [al,ah]⊂ [0,1].
Along the sequence {Et : t∈N} as the economy becomes more discretized, I make
additional assumptions on σ1 so that the model has a well-defined limit. The prob-
ability of meeting potential suppliers increases, i.e., limt→∞ λt = ∞, but at a rate
slower than that at which the economy is discretized, i.e., limt→∞ λtMt = 0. At the same
time, match-specific productivities are drawn from stochastically worse distributions
as limt→∞ a0,t = 0. While the number of potential suppliers grows arbitrarily large
and the match-specific productivity associated with any single supplier is drawn from
a stochastically worse distribution, the limit is well behaved because the probability
of encountering a supplier with match-specific productivity greater than a does not
change in the limiting economy, i.e., limt→∞λtaζ0,t = 1.
12 Furthermore, the economy
becomes discretized in a manner such that the proportion of firms and households at
every location is non-zero and finite. The following assumption states this formally.
12This kind of assumption was shown to have a well-defined limit by Kortum (1997) and put to use
for a similar purpose by Oberfield (2018).
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Assumption 5. The discretizing sequence of economies {Et : t∈N} satisfies the follow-
ing conditions:13
(1) {λt,a0,t : t∈N} is such that λt=o(Mt) and λtaζ0,t=Θ(1)
(2) {Md,t,Ld,t :d∈J ,t∈N} is such thatMd,t=Θ(Mt) and Ld,t=Θ(Lt) for all d∈J
This completes the description of the probabilistic model. Let T ≡ {Td :d∈J }, θ ≡
{θd :d∈}J , κ≡{κd :d∈J }, η≡{ηd :d∈J }, and α≡{αd :d∈J }. Through Assump-
tions 1 and 2, the part of the aggregate state contained in σ0 in the limiting economy
can then be redefined as σ0≡{T ,θ,κ,η,τ}.
3.3. Aggregate Implications. I now proceed to characterize equilibrium prices %≡
{p(σ),c(σ),w(σ)} in the limiting economy, i.e., limt→∞Et. In the limiting economy, for
any given realization of σ0, wages and cross-sectional distributions of effective prices
and marginal costs at all locations are invariant across all realizations of σ1. Therefore,
equilibrium prices in the limiting economy can be expressed as %≡{p(σ0),c(σ0),w(σ0)}.
I begin with distributional properties of effective prices andmarginal costs. Next, I pro-
vide model implications for firm-to-firm trade and trade between locations which lead
to the characterization of wages in the trade equilibrium.
3.3.1. Distributions of Effective Prices and Markups. With limit pricing, the distribu-
tion of effective prices faced by a firm for any of its tasks or that faced by a household for
any of its needs is characterized by the distribution of the offer with the second lowest
effective cost to the supplier. The following proposition provides the distribution of
effective prices in the limiting economy.
Proposition 1. For any realization of σ0, the effective prices of materials used by firm
b to accomplish any task, pd(b,k), and that of goods consumed by household i to satisfy






























13For any two functions f(n) and g(n), f(n) = o (g(n)) =⇒ limn→∞ f(n)g(n) = 0 and
f(n)=Θ(g(n) =⇒ limsupn→∞
|f(n)|
g(n) <∞ and limsupn→∞ |
f(n)
g(n) |>0.





where µo denotes the proportion of firms at o and E{Ko}[·] denotes the expectation over
all realizations of numbers of tasks Ko across firms at o.
The distribution of effective prices conditional on σ0 is obtained by appealing to a law
of large numbers afforded by Definition 2. While the effective price faced by individual
firms and households varies across realizations of σ1, the cross-sectional distribution in
the limit economy does not. These distributions are parametrized by a scale parameter
Ad and a shape parameter ζ. Market access, given by Ad, is a key object of interest
because it summarizes the probabilistic access of firms at d to inputs from all locations.
The functional form suggests that firms at a location with higher market access face
stochastically lower effective prices. Specifically, if Ad > Ad′ , the distribution Fpd′ (·)
first-order stochastically dominates Fpd(·).
Focussing on equation (3.7), market accessAd is a trade friction (τ−ζod ) weighted sumof
the attractiveness of all locations o∈J , i.e., nearer locations receive higher weights be-
cause of lower trade costs τod and vice versa. The attractiveness of a location o for sourc-
ing inputs is determined by four factors: (a) density of firmsµo; (b) average productivity
among firms To; (c) its own market access Ao; and (d) wages wo. Locations with higher
density, higher average productivity, higher market access or lower wages are more at-
tractive. In addition, the attractiveness of a location o is more sensitive to its market
accessAo and less so towageswo ifmaterials share of costsαo is higher at o andvice versa.
Although the effective price is characterized by the distribution of the offer with the
second lowest effective cost to the supplier, it is still the supplier with the lowest effective
cost that is selected. The distribution of markups faced by the firm or the household is
characterized by that of the ratio of the second lowest to the lowest effective costs in-
curred by the second best and the best suppliers respectively. In addition, Assumption
5 implies that in the limiting economy, every firm or household encounters at least two
potential suppliers with probability approaching one and this ensures that markups are
well-behaved.15 The following proposition provides the distribution of markups.
Proposition 2. Markups over marginal cost of lowest cost supplier m̄od(·,·,·) are dis-






The shape parameter of the distribution of potential markups is ζ, the same pa-
rameter that governs dispersion in match-specific productivities. With lower ζ, higher















It then follows that limt→∞P(|Sd(b)|<2)=0.
22
markups are more likely since high match-specific productivities are more likely and
hence are larger gaps between costs to the best and second best suppliers. Moreover,
the distribution of markups is the same in any destination. An aggregate implication
that follows from the distribution of markups is that the share of variable costs in gross
output is given by 1
1+1/ζ
at all locations. This in turn implies that value-added share of





3.3.2. Distributions of Marginal Costs. The marginal cost of a firm determines (albeit,
partially) whether it is selected by potential customers and if so, the intensity with
which it is used. It is therefore a key variable governing network formation between
firms. The marginal cost of the firm is itself determined by its own productivity, wage
faced by it for hiring labor, and the effective price faced by it for its tasks. Since pro-
ductivity, number of tasks and effective price faced for each task are randomly drawn
for each firm, the marginal cost of any given firm is a random variable that is itself the
product of a random number (number of tasks) of random variables (effective price for
each task). In lieu of the distribution functionwhich does not have a closed-form charac-
terization, I provide closed-form expressions for moments of marginal costs distribution
in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. For any realization of σ0, the distribution of marginal costs at any























where ψ(n)(·) denotes polygamma functions.16
What factors affect average marginal costs of firms at a location? Intuitively, firms’
marginal costs will be low on average if they are more productive, are able to source
intermediate inputs at lower prices, and face lower cost of hiring labor. Equation (3.9)
suggests that average marginal costs are lower at locations where firms (a) have higher
average productivity (higher To); (b) face stochastically lower effective prices for their
tasks thanks to better market access (higherAo); and (c) face lower costs of hiring labor
(lowerwo). Further, average marginal costs are more sensitive to market access and less




so to wages if materials share of costs αo is higher and vice versa. Of these factors that
influence average marginal costs, {T ,α} are exogenous location characteristics whereas
{A,w} constitute endogenous price variables.
What factors affect dispersion of marginal costs in equilibrium at a location? Mar-
ginal costs of firms differ from one another due to differences in productivity and due
to differences in effective prices faced for their respective tasks. Equation (3.10) sheds
light on the role of these two channels. The first term in equation (3.10) reveals the
contribution of differences in productivities across firms. Locations where dispersion
in productivities is higher (lower θo) will have a higher dispersion in marginal costs.
More importantly, the second term in equation (3.10) reveals the contribution of differ-
ences in effective prices faced by firms. Focussing on equation (3.10), its contribution
is governed by three factors. First and foremost, the contribution is decreasing in ζ.
A lower ζ increases the likelihood of high draws of match-specific productivities and
therefore generates higher dispersion in effective prices. This factor is common across
all locations. Second, the contribution is higher at locations with higher materials share
of costs (higher αo). Naturally, if materials form a larger share of costs, dispersion in
price of materials plays a larger role. Finally, the contribution is lower at locations with
higher numbers of tasks (lower E[1/Ko] or higher κo). With higher numbers of tasks, for
one firm’s price of materials to be substantially higher than another, it requires a larger
number of high draws of match-specific productivities. Since such an occurrence is
unlikely, locations with higher κo have lower dispersion in materials prices across firms.
3.3.3. Conditional Choice Probabilities & Firm-to-FirmTrade. I turn to predictions for
firm-to-firm trade. Since these are not aggregate implications but rather are at the firm-
to-firm level, it is notmeaningful to consider the limiting economy. Therefore, I consider
a sufficiently large economy along the sequence in Definition 2 such that Assumption
5 holds, i.e., λ/M 1, |λaζ0−1|<ε1, and |a0|<ε2 for arbitrarily small values of ε1 and
ε2. Recall from equation (3.1) that firms choose suppliers for tasks based on suppliers’
marginal costs, trade costs faced by them, and match-specific productivities associated
with the task under consideration. While trade costs τ constitute σ0, match-specific
productivities are unknown and suppliers’ marginal costs co(s) are determined endoge-
nously. I therefore characterize conditional choice probabilities for supplier choice, i.e.,
probabilities for choice of supplier conditional on its marginal cost but in expectation
over match-specific productivities that are yet to be realized. Let π0od(s,b) denote the
probability with which firm b selects firm s for any one of its tasks. Prior to realizing the
match-specific productivities for each task {aod(s,b,k)}k∈Kd(b), the probability of firm s
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getting selected for any one of the tasks by firm b is common across all tasks. That is,
π0od(s,b)=π
0
od(s,b,k)=E{a}[1{s=s∗d(b,k) |a}] where the expectation operator is over all
realizations of aod(s,b,k). The following proposition provides expressions for conditional
choice probabilities π0od(s,b) as well as for ρ0od(s,b), the probability with which firm b
selects firm s for at least one of its tasks – thereby determining the extensive margin of
firm-to-firm trade. As it turns out, these probabilities are independent of the identity
of the buyer at the destination and therefore can be written as π0od(s,−) and ρ0od(s,−).
Proposition 4. For any realization of σ0, conditional on firm s’s marginal cost being








Further, conditional on firm s’s marginal cost being co(s), the probability with which





The above proposition is key to understanding what drives network formation among
firms in the model and how it enables the model to match empirical regularities de-
scribed in Section 2. On one hand, equation (3.11) highlights the factors that influence
the likelihood of a supplier s from o getting selected by a buyer at d for any one of its
tasks. Firms with lower marginal costs, denoted by co(s), are more likely to get selected
for more tasks. Firms that are located nearer to the buyers and face lower trade costs,
denoted by τod, are more likely to get selected for more tasks. Moreover, the elasticity of
the likelihood of getting selected with respect to marginal costs or trade costs is decreas-







=−ζ. With lower ζ, Assumption 4 implies that
high match-specific productivities are more likely and the choice of supplier is less sen-
sitive to other factors, i.e., its marginal cost and the trade cost faced by it. On the other
hand, equation (3.12) shows that the same factors also influence whether a supplier s
from o gets selected by a buyer at d for at least one of its tasks or none at all, i.e., the ex-
tensive margin of firm-to-firm trade. Since ρ0od(s,−) is increasing in π0od(s,−), marginal
costs co(s), trade costs τod and dispersion in match-productivities governed by ζ affect
the extensive margin of supplier choice in the same manner as above. In addition to
these factors, equation (3.12) also suggests that firms aremore likely to find customers at
destinations where buyers have higher numbers of tasks (higher κd). Naturally, if buyers
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have larger numbers of tasks, the supplier draws a larger number of match-specific pro-
ductivities, has a better chance of getting high draws and hence get selected by a buyer.
In summary, this proposition channels the role of the upstream margin — at any lo-
cation d, firms with lower marginal costs are likely to find more customers and are also
likely to be used intensively by them. The role of geography in the upstream margin
comes from the dependence of these probabilities on trade costs — firms from o are less
likely to be successful both at the extensive and intensive margins of firm-to-firm trade
across potential customers at d if o is farther, i.e., τod is higher. These results then lead
to predictions for trade between locations. Since those are aggregate predictions, they
are derived for the limiting economy.
3.3.4. Sourcing Probabilities & Trade between Locations. Conditional choice probabili-
ties of supplier choice naturally aggregate to sourcing probabilities. That is, the proba-
bility with which any buyer sources inputs from o for any one its tasks can be obtained as
the sum of conditional choice probabilities associated with all the suppliers located at o.
The limiting economy assumption comes in handy here as it allows aggregation across
firms within a location. Conditional choice probabilities from Proposition 4 together
with properties of the cross-sectional distributions of effective prices andmarginal costs
from Propositions 1 and 3 lead to the next proposition. This proposition characterizes
sourcing probabilities across origins by firm b, denoted by π0od(•,b), as well as ρ0od(•,b),
the probability with which firm b sources from o for at least one of its tasks. As in the
previous proposition, these probabilities are independent of the identity of the buyer
at the destination and therefore can be written as π0od(•,−) and ρ0od(•,−).
Proposition 5. For any realization of σ0, the probability with which any firm located
























Further, the probability with which any firm located in d selects a supplier from o for at





Sourcing probabilities in equation (3.13) hark back to market access defined in equa-
tion (3.7). Recall that market access is a weighted sum of attractiveness of all locations
for a particular destination. Equation (3.13) suggests the probability with which a
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buyer from d sources intermediate inputs from o for any one of its tasks is given by the
contribution of location o towards market access of firms at d. Firms at d are more likely
to source inputs from o if there are a larger number of firms at o (higher µo), firms at o
have higher productivities on average (higher To), wage wo is lower, or firms at o have












capture that fact that when materials share αo is higher or dispersion parameter θo is
lower supply chains routed through firms at o are likely to be more efficient. The same
factors also affect the likelihood of a buyer at d sourcing from o for at least one of its
tasks or none at all. Since ρ0od(•,−) is increasing in π0od(•,−), a similar explanation
holds for origin selection at the extensive margin. In addition to these factors, equation
(3.14) also suggests that firms at d are more likely to source from o if they have higher
numbers of tasks (higher κd). The explanation for this parallels that of how equation
(3.12) affects the extensive margin of firm-to-firm trade.
Further, under the simplifying assumption that θo = θ, αo = α, and κd = κ at all
























τ−ζod denotes the market access at location d. This
bears resemblance to aggregate trade shares between locations obtained in Eaton and

















τ−θod denotes the market access at location d, α denotes
the materials share of costs while To and θ are parameters of the Fréchet productivity
distribution at location o given by P(zo(s)≤z)=e−Toz
−θ
1{z≥0}.
The sourcing probabilities also bear resemblance to aggregate trade shares between
locations obtained in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). In their case, aggregate trade


























od denotes themarket access at location d,
fod denotes fixed costs of exporting from location o to location d, σ denotes the elasticity
of substitution across differentiated goods while To and θ are parameters of the Pareto









In this context, two facts are worth noting about Equation (3.15): (a) the elasticity
of trade shares with respect to trade costs comes from the shape parameter of match-
specific productivities ζ and not the dispersion of productivities θ, and (b) trade shares
are increasing in the density of firms at the origin µo. The former unlinks the dispersion
in idiosyncratic productivities from the trade elasticity while the latter introduces a
probabilistic notion of “love of variety” within the Ricardian framework.
3.3.5. Trade Equilibrium. Equation (3.13) suggests that the probability of sourcing
from a particular origin o is common for all tasks across all firms at a destination d and
that the choice is conditionally independent across firms at the destination. Therefore,
the law of large numbers implies that in the limiting economy aggregate trade shares
converge to the sourcing probabilities, i.e., limt→∞π0od(Et)=π0od(•,−). This brings us to
the proposition below which states that the trade equilibrium in the limiting economy
is satisfied with trade shares given by π0od(•,−) for all networks that are realized for any
given σ0.
Proposition 6. For any realization of σ0, w≡{wd :d∈J } solves the following system










This concludes the characterization of equilibrium prices and brings us to the defini-
tion of the trade equilibrium below.
Definition 3. For any given σ0, the trade equilibrium in the limiting economy is de-
fined as the vector of wages w such that (a) market access at each location satisfies
equation (3.7); (b) trade shares coincide with sourcing probabilities in equation (3.13)
and (c) the market clearing condition in equation (3.16) holds.
The trade equilibrium along with tractable expressions for firm-to-firm trade and
aggregate trade in Propositions 4 and 5 give rise to transparent estimating equations
for the model, to which I turn next.
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4. Empirical Framework
This section lays out the procedure for estimation of the model and counterfactual
analysis. The objective of estimation is to infer the aggregate state σ0 that consists
of trade costs, firms’ idiosyncratic productivities, and firms’ task intensities given the
observed data. Estimation relies on Proposition 4. With the estimated model, coun-
terfactual analysis for large economies is then conducted by relying on Proposition 6 to
evaluate the change in aggregate outcomes that results in response to shocks deriving
from a change in the aggregate state σ0 to σ′0. For clarity, state variables ∆, parameters








τ−ζod : (o,d)∈J ×J
}}
Θ≡{ζ,α,θ,κ}
D≡{{πod(s,b) : (s,b)∈Mo×Md},Xod : (o,d)∈J ×J }
where πod(s,b) denotes the share of firm s in firm b’s material costs and Xod denotes
the vector of bilateral origin-destination observables such as distance and borders etc.
In what follows, terms with superscript (·)0 denote true values and those with super-
script (·)∗ denote corresponding estimates. Changes in quantities are denoted by (̂·).17
For example, π0od(s,b) denotes true values of conditional choice probabilities, π∗od(s,b)
denotes estimates of conditional choice probabilities , and π̂0od(s,b) denotes changes in
conditional choice probabilities from the initial to the counterfactual state.
4.1. Estimation of Marginal Costs and Trade Frictions. I reformulate the eco-
nomic model developed in the previous section as a multinomial logit model of supplier
choice for tasks of each of the firms and estimate it semi-parametrically. Firm’s mar-
ginal costs are estimated as firm fixed effects and bilateral origin-destination fixed
effects correspond to a structural gravity specification for estimating trade frictions.
Trade frictions are then estimated by projecting bilateral fixed effects on observables.
Together, these provide estimates of conditional choice probabilities for firm-to-firm
trade as well as sourcing probabilities for trade between locations.
4.1.1. Marginal Costs & Structural Gravity. The econometric model can be motivated
using the balls and bins problem. Consider the multinomial random variable character-
ized by a firm b located at d throwingKd(b) balls (one for each of its tasks) intoM bins.





Each of these bins corresponds to a potential supplier, denoted by s. The probability
with which any of these balls falls into the bin indexed s is given by the expression
for π0od(s,−) from Proposition 4. A realization of this random variable consists of the
proportion of balls that landed in each of the bins. Since tasks are symmetric and the
production function of firm b takes the Cobb-Douglas functional form, the model coun-
terpart of this realization is the vector of cost shares of firm b across all suppliers in the
economy. In other words, the cost share of firm b that can be attributed to firm s stands
in for the relative frequency of firm s’s successes in getting selected across firm b’s tasks.
Since there are a discrete number of tasks, π0od(s,b) is only the expected share of tasks
for which firm b uses the output of firm s. Any given realization may deviate from this
expected value for particularly high or low realizations of match-specific productivities
and from randomness in buyer-seller encounters between firms.18 Therefore, making








This multinomial logit specification is non-standard because of two reasons. On one
hand, firms’ marginal costs (included as firm fixed effects) are endogenously determined
in the model through supplier choice decisions of all the firms in the economy. Since
match-specific productivities are independent across firms and tasks in their production
function, the supplier choice decision is however conditionally independent. Therefore,
firm fixed effects estimated using this specification can be treated as the conditional
distribution of marginal costs without resorting to full solution methods to estimate
the model. This is analogous to the estimation of conditional choice probabilities in
18One could draw an analogy by reinterpreting the Eaton and Kortum (2002) model of trade between
countries as the representative agent in the destination country throwing infinitely many balls (one for
each commodity arranged on a continuum) into a finite number of bins (one for each origin country).
Since the bins are finite in number while balls are infinitely many, sourcing probabilities coincide
with aggregate trade shares deterministically. In contrast, the model here is of trade between firms
where the customer firm throws a finite number of balls (one for each task) into potentially infinitely
many bins (one for every firm in the economy). Since the bins are infinitely many in number while
balls are finite in number, neither conditional choice probabilities determine firm-to-firm trade shares
deterministically nor do sourcing probabilities determine aggregate trade shares deterministically.
19In related work, Eaton et al. (2013) also specify a multinomial likelihood function for international
trade between countries derived from a different economicmodel and conduct estimation using pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimation à la Gourieroux et al. (1984). The dimensionality of their estimation
program is determined by the number of countries which is a much smaller number compared to the
specification herewhere the dimensionality is determined by the number of firms that runs intomillions.
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dynamic discrete choice models following Hotz and Miller (1993) and its application
to network formation with many agents in Menzel (2015).20 On the other hand, since
there are a large number of firms in the economy, estimation of the multinomial logit
model would typically require high-dimensional non-linear optimization over a very
large number of parameters to solve for the estimates. This can be computationally
infeasible using standard Newton methods when the number of fixed effects runs into
millions. However, this issue can be avoided by appealing to several special features of
the multinomial likelihood function. First, estimates can be obtained using the Poisson
likelihood function with additional fixed effects (see Baker (1994); Taddy (2015)). Sec-
ond, Poisson likelihood estimation automatically satisfies adding up constraints implied
by the model (see Fally (2015)). Third, Poisson likelihood specification allows solving
for fixed effects in closed-form (for example, see Hausman et al. (1984)). Finally, subse-
quent estimation of trade frictions using bilateral fixed effects does not suffer from the
incidental parameters problem and hence can be conducted through the conditional

















The above specificationwith fixed effects however presents a problem of perfectmulti-









are collinear for all such locations o. Hence, I make the following nor-
malizations so that these fixed effects are identified up to scale.
















m̄od(s,b,k)τodaod(s,b,k) × co(s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
upstream value function

discount factor︷ ︸︸ ︷
αd
Kd(b)
In this context, conditional choice probabilities from Proposition 4 are therefore the probabilities
with which any given supplier s is chosen for any one of the buyer b’s tasks.
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marginal costs relative to their location average to unity. It separates within and be-
tween location heterogeneity in firms’ marginal costs. The within location component
is captured by differences in c̃o(s) while the between location component is captured
by differences in co across locations.21 Under this assumption, the first order condi-
tions implied by the likelihood maximization problem in equation (4.2) can be solved
to obtain closed-form estimators for fixed effects as described in the proposition below.





























The estimators for firm fixed effects in equation (4.3) neatly bridge theoretical predic-
tions on firm-to-firm trade in equation (3.11) and empirical regularities arising from the
decomposition in equation (2.1). The decomposition in equation (2.1) suggested that
larger firms also tend to have higher intensity of use. Conditional choice probabilities
in equation (3.11) predict that firms with low marginal costs are likely to have higher
intensity of use. Equation (4.3) shows that firms’ intensity of use is a sufficient statistic
for its marginal costs, albeit scaled with an elasticity ζ. In addition, the theoretical
expression for bilateral origin-destination fixed effects in equation (4.4) corresponds
to a structural gravity specification. For any pair of locations (o,d), the estimator for
this specification is the simple average of the cost share across firms at d that can be
attributed to purchase of goods from firms in o. This is the empirical counterpart of
sourcing probabilities in equation (3.13).
4.1.2. Trade Frictions, Conditional Choice Probabilities, and Sourcing Probabilities.
With firm fixed effects out of the way, thanks to equation (4.3), trade frictions can
now be estimated by projecting bilateral origin-destination fixed effects (from equa-
tion (4.4)) on bilateral observables such as distance, borders etc., similar to gravity
21The between location component captures both differences in average marginal cost between loca-
tions and also differences arising from having a higher number of firms at one location than another.
To see this clearly, note that if marginal costs are identical across firms at location o, i.e., co(s) = c̄o
. Then, co=M
−1/ζ
o c̄o, which depends on both the number of firms and the average marginal cost.
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This delivers estimates of origin fixed effects
(
c−ζo
)∗ and trade frictions (τ−ζod )∗ =
exp(X ′odβ
∗). The manner in which trade frictions are estimated here differs from the
standard approach of projecting aggregate trade flows on distance and border dum-
mies (for example, see Agnosteva et al. (2019)). The dependent variable implied by
the model is not aggregate trade flows (for example, Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006))
or aggregate trade shares (as in Eaton et al. (2013)) but average trade share across




is an unweighted average of the sourcing share from o across all buyers at a destination.
While this is not comparable to aggregate trade flows, it closely related to aggregate
trade shares. In contrast to average trade shares which is a simple average of sourc-
ing shares across firms, the aggregate trade share is a weighted average of individual
sourcing probabilities where each individual buyer is weighted by its size.22 To the
extent that size of buyers is correlated with their sourcing probabilities from an origin,
aggregate trade shares bias the estimates of the trade frictions faced by individual firms
for the purposes of estimation here.
Fitted shares from the gravity regressions are the estimates of sourcing probabilities.
Estimates of conditional choice probabilities are then obtained from firm fixed effects
and estimates of sourcing probabilities. Formally, the estimates of conditional choice






































The procedure for estimating structural elasticities Θ is relegated to Appendix C.2.
Estimation results are presented in Appendix C.5.
4.2. Counterfactual Analysis. For counterfactual analysis, I consider the limiting
economy as described inDefinition 2. To operationalize Proposition 6 for counterfactual
analysis, it is useful to express the trade equilibrium in changes. The following defini-
tion states that and motivates the algorithm for evaluating counterfactual outcomes in
response to shocks that derive from a change in the aggregate state σ0 to σ′0.
Definition 4. For any change in aggregate state σ0 to σ′0, equilibrium change in wages




are characterized the following system


























δ̂od : (o,d)∈J ×J
}
is function of shocks that capture the resultant effect of
change from σ0 to σ′0.
With this definition of the equilibrium in changes in the limiting economy, the pro-
cedure for computing counterfactual outcomes consists of three steps. First, I evaluate
the expected value of aggregate and firm-level outcomes such as intensity of use and
sales in the initial state. Second, I evaluate changes in aggregate outcomes when going
from the initial state to the counterfactual state. This is done using a tâtonnement al-
gorithm similar to Alvarez and Lucas (2007) and Dekle et al. (2008). Finally, I evaluate
the expected value of aggregate and firm-level outcomes in the counterfactual state.
Details of the procedure are stated in Appendix C.4.
5. Counterfactual Analysis
This section illustrates how the model can be used to assess the consequences of
micro- and macro- shocks to the spatial economy. The procedure for counterfactual
analysis proposed in Section 4.2 allows evaluation of welfare gains at the district level
23The expression for welfare changes is derived in Appendix C.3.
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as well as the impact on firms’ sales and intensity of use of these shocks. First, I discuss
a counterfactual experiment that reduces trade frictions across state borders. Second,
I discuss how the production network of firms changes in response to an aggregate
shock that uniformly reduces external trade frictions. Finally, I examine the implica-
tions of neutralizing firm-level distortions when they are either positively or negatively
correlated with firm size on aggregate and firm-level outcomes.
5.1. Decline in Border Frictions. When India adopted the VAT in the early 2000s,
its implementation was uneven. India has a federal system of government — one that
divides the powers of government between the national and the state governments.
Commercial taxation being overseen by the state government, individual states im-
plemented their own respective VAT systems. This resulted in over 30 such systems
coming into place across India. While this increased formality and tax compliance, it
had the unintended consequence of regional segregation in organization of production,
for three reasons. First, VAT increases formality because firms prefer to source inputs
from other firms within the system to be able to collect tax credits on input purchases.
Consequently, individual firms preferred to source inputs from firms within their own
state’s VAT system as opposed to one in a different state or VAT system. Second, the
national government levied a sales tax on firm-to-firm transactions across state borders
which made more efficient suppliers of intermediate inputs relatively more expensive
if they were in a different state. Third, there were cumbersome inspections, especially
at state borders that caused logistical delays. In July 2017, the federal government
in India abolished all state VAT systems and introduced the Goods and Services Tax
to serve as a single national VAT system. This eliminated sales taxes on inter-state
movement of goods and harmonized the VAT structure across states in an attempt to
reduce such barriers to intra-national trade.
In this context, I consider the aggregate and firm-level impact of a 10% decline in
trade costs between district pairs crossing state borders to understand the potential
impact of the GST reform on production networks in intra-national trade. Figure 5.1
suggests that this leads to sizable welfare gains of 1% in some districts to as large as 8%
in others. Across states, the median district in larger states Gujarat, Maharashtra, and
Tamil Nadu gains less than those in smaller states West Bengal and Odisha. Changes
in firms’ sales to other firms can be decomposed into changes in its intensity of use and
changes in its average customer size as follows:
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Note. The left panel is a stacked histogram of welfare changes across districts. The
right panel is a box and whiskers plot of welfare gains across districts within each
state. States are arranged by economic size in descending order. The data used in















Average Customer Size︸ ︷︷ ︸
second order term
To determine the relative contribution of the upstream and downstream margins to
the dispersion in changes in firms’ sales, I apply a Shapley decomposition (see Shorrocks
(2013)). The Shapley decomposition determines the expected marginal contribution of
each of these margins and the interaction term to the total variation in changes in firms’
input sales; intuitively, it assigns the fraction of the R2 of a regression that is due to
each set of explanatory variables. Table 5.1 reports the results of this decomposition.
Column (6) suggests that over half of the variation in changes in firms’ sales can be
attributed to endogenous changes in the network or the upstream margin while a third
can be attributed to the downstream margin. In columns (1)-(5), when considering
variation among firms within each state, the upstream margin accounts for only over
third of the variation. This is because the incidence of the shock is at the state borders,
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Table 5.1. Decline in Border Frictions: Margins of Changes in
Firms’ Sales
State MH TN GJ WB OD All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆% upstream margin 40.76% 40.81% 36.49% 39.44% 38.06% 55.69%
∆% downstream margin 29.37% 34.14% 45.74% 31.44% 43.02% 33.45%
second order term 29.86% 25.04% 17.76% 29.14% 18.91% 10.85%
Note. This table reports the contribution of changes in firm’s margins to the
variation in changes in firms’ sales calculated using a Shapley decomposition when
firm-year observations are split by state. Here, MH stands for Maharashtra, GJ for
Gujarat, TN for Tamil Nadu, WB for West Bengal, and OD for Odisha.
so the contribution of the upstream margin is not as high as that seen in the cross-state
comparison in column (6).
A few points are in order. First, this decomposition is of sales to other firms and
so would not exist in models without input-output linkages. Second, in models with
exogenous production networks, i.e., with Cobb-Douglas technologies between firms,
intensity of use does not respond to shocks. The large variation in the upstreammargin
would therefore be missing. Finally, in models with non-Cobb–Douglas technologies
that endogenize the intensity with which existing suppliers are used but where the ex-
tensive margin of firm-to-firm trade does not respond to shocks, the explanatory power
of the upstream margin would be understated. This is because changes in intensity of
use accrue not only from changes in intensity of use by existing customers but also from
changes in the number of customers. By allowing for substitution across both existing
suppliers and new potential suppliers, the model is not only more general but also more
tractable since it does not require calibrating the extensive margin of firm-to-firm trade
to observed data.
5.2. Market Integration. A large body of recent literature studies barriers that im-
pede trade between regions within a country and the gains that accrue from a reduction
in those barriers (for a review, seeDonaldson (2015)). I study the firm-level implications
of a decline in relative costs of trading with firms in other districts. This experiment
conceptually captures improvements in transportation infrastructure as well as any
other policy changes that affect trade outside an agent’s own location relative to within
its own location. I consider the counterfactual scenario where external trade frictions
37
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Note. For each year, firms are grouped into 1000 bins according to their sales in the
initial equilibrium. Each bin consists of around 1000 firms. For firms in each of these
bins, the top left panel plots the average percent change in intensity of use when
trade frictions decline, the top right panel does the same for average customer size,
and the bottom panel for sales to other firms.
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decline by 10%.24 With a decline in external trade costs, a large majority of firms are
subject to opposing forces along the upstream and downstream margins.
Figure 5.2 depicts the effect of these margins of firms’ sales to other firms. To under-
stand this, it is useful to look at firms in four groups: (a) those in the top 5% in terms
of sales; (b) those in the top 10% but not in the top 5%; (c) those in the top 25% but
not in the top 10%; and (d) those in the bottom 75%. First, consider firms in group (a).
Starting with the top left panel, these firms gain the most in intensity of use. At the
same time, they are more likely to have had customers who are large, i.e., in the top 5%
and whose sales declined. This implies that the average customer size of these firms de-
clines as shown in the top right panel. These firms are subject to opposing forces on the
upstream and downstream margins. While they gain in intensity of use, the lose suffi-
ciently in average customer size that their sales decline. Second, consider firms in group
(b). These firms still gain above 4% in intensity of use but are also likely to have had
customers in the top 5% (whose sales declined). These firms are also subject to opposing
forces on the upstream and downstream margins such that their sales increase. Third,
consider firms in group (c). These firms gain less than 4% in intensity of use, are less
likely to have had customers in the top 5% and so their average customer size increases.
These firms are also subject to reinforcing forces on the upstream and downstream
margins such that their sales increase. Finally, consider the large majority of firms in
group (d). These firms lose in intensity of use, but are also much less likely to have
had customers in the top 5%, so their average customer size increases. These firms are
subject to opposing forces on the upstream and downstream margins. While they lose
in intensity of use, the gain sufficiently in average customer size that their sales increase.
Taking stock, as trade frictions decline, firms with low production costs becomemore
successful at farther or less remote destinations in getting selected for customers’ tasks.
This comes at the expense of firms with higher production costs who are now less suc-
cessful in getting selected for tasks both locally and elsewhere. While intensity of use
of firms in the bottom three quartiles decreases by as much as 8%, intensity of use for
firms in the top quartile increases by as much as 4%. At the same time, firms in the
top decile are more likely to have customers in the top 5% those for whom sales has
24Counterfactual outcomes are evaluated using the procedure described in Appendix C.4 with







There is no heterogeneity in shocks at the firm-level in this counterfactual experiment.
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declined. Those customers produce less and source fewer inputs from firms in the top
decile. Average customer size for firms in the top decile and quantity demanded from
them declines. On the contrary, firms in the bottom nine deciles are less likely to have
customers in the top 5% for whom sales has declined. For these firms, average customer
size has increased. The net outcome of these margins acting on firms at all quantiles is
that large firms’ sales to other firms shrink where as those of a large majority of firms
in the lower quantiles expands.
5.3. Size-Dependent Distortions & Improvements in Allocative Efficiency.
A substantial literature has documented the presence of firm-level distortions in devel-
oping economies (for a review, seeAtkin andKhandelwal (2020)). In this counterfactual
experiment, I study the implications of neutralizing positively versus negatively size-
dependent distortions affecting firms’ labor input choice. The notion for such gains
is similar in spirit to that in the closed economy model with labor wedges as in Hsieh
and Klenow (2009), multiplier effects from inter-sectoral linkages as in Jones (2013),
and trade as in Swiecki (2017). Unlike these papers, I consider the effect of removing
firm-level distortions through the lens of a model of trade where production networks
between firms respond endogenously. The experiment I consider homogenizes labor
market distortions. That is, it eliminates dispersion in those firm-specific labor market
“taxes” and hence consists of shocks at the firm level. In conducting this analysis, I
assume that all tax revenue is rebated equally to local households both in the initial
state and the counterfactual state and hence the level of the homogeneous tax rate
in the counterfactual scenario does not affect welfare calculations.25 Figure 5.3 shows
that terms of trade effects are negative in a large number of districts when removing





η if distortions are positively size-dependent
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1
η if distortions are negatively size-dependent
,
where q denotes the quantile of the firm for sales to other firms and η denotes the shape





1{t≥0} . For generating distortions, η was calibrated
to 5. Counterfactual outcomes are evaluated using the procedure described in Appendix C.4 with
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Negatively Size-Dependent Distortions
Note. The left panel plots direct and terms of trade effects when distortions
are positively size-dependent and the right panel when distortions are negatively
size-dependent. Points are shaded by state in both panels, darker shades indicate
richer states. For each district, direct effects are calculated as the increase the total
factor productivity if each district were a closed economy. Terms-of-trade effects are
calculated as the difference between the welfare change from the experiment and the
direct effects.
negatively size-dependent distortions while they are largely positive when removing
positively size-dependent distortions.
The result of removing distortions at the firm-level is that firms that faced higher tax
rates and were too small, now expand, with labor being reallocated to them as inmodels
of misallocation such as Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).
While this captures direct effects, the analysis here also takes into account indirect ef-
fects through input-output linkages between firms and the endogenous response of the
network structure to these shocks. To examine how this experiment affects the produc-
tion network between firms, I consider the decomposition of changes in firms’ sales to
other firms into changes in its intensity of use and changes in its average customer size.
Table 5.2 reports the results of a Shapley decomposition of margins of sales. I find that
changes in intensity of use explain majority of variation in changes in firms’ sales —
around 80% with positively size-dependent distortions and 75% with negatively size-
dependent distortions. The downstream margin is however less important in the case
of negatively size-dependent distortions than in the case of positively size-dependent
distortions. This is because firms with lower sales and facing larger distortions are
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Table 5.2. Elimination of Size-Dependent Distortions: Mar-
gins of Changes in Firms’ Sales
State MH TN GJ WB OD All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Positively Size-Dependent Distortions
∆% upstream margin 73.87% 82.02% 82.52% 80.47% 74.82% 81.16%
∆% downstream margin 11.81% 8.23% 6.75% 9.89% 12.00% 8.34%
second order term 14.31% 9.74% 10.71% 9.63% 13.17% 10.48%
Negatively Size-Dependent Distortions
∆% upstream margin 66.57% 73.23% 80.73% 78.01% 71.25% 75.08%
∆% downstream margin 1.34% 1.40% 1.57% 3.11% 1.11% 1.58%
second order term 32.07% 25.35% 17.69% 18.80% 27.57% 23.32%
Note. This table reports the contribution of changes in firm’s margins to the
variation in changes in firms’ sales calculated using a Shapley decomposition when
firm-year observations are split by state. Here, MH stands for Maharashtra, GJ for
Gujarat, TN for Tamil Nadu, WB for West Bengal, and OD for Odisha.
likely to have had higher production costs. Since their customers sourced inputs from
relatively expensive suppliers, they likely had higher production costs themselves and
therefore change relatively less in size when such distortions are neutralized.
6. Conclusion
This paper developed a new framework for analyzing aggregate and firm-level con-
sequences of shocks to the spatial economy when customer-supplier linkages between
firms evolve endogenously. I documented that Indian firms with higher sales to other
firms tend to havemore customers, tend to be usedmore intensively by those customers,
and tend to have larger customers. Firms’ intensity of use explains a vast majority of
variation in their sales to other firms. The model explains this through a single dimen-
sion of firm heterogeneity: production costs. Firms with low production costs findmore
customers, are used more intensively by them and since their customers use cheaper
inputs intensively, they lower production costs and become larger themselves. Further-
more, firms differ not only in their relative position in the production network, but also
across space thereby facing different wages when hiring labor as well as different trade
costs when sourcing inputs from potentially multiple locations.
Interdependence of link formation between firms in general equilibriummodels of net-
work formation typically restrains the use of simulation-based estimation to arbitrary
scale, i.e., with very large numbers of firms. On the contrary, the procedure developed
here makes estimation and counterfactual analysis both scalable and tractable. Firms’
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intensity of use was shown to be a sufficient statistic for their production costs — a key
endogenous object of interest. As a result, estimation did not necessitate full solution of
the model to obtain the distribution of production costs. Besides, counterfactual anal-
ysis did not require large-scale simulation either and was done under a large economy
approximation to resolve aggregate uncertainty. In an empirical application, I show
that a 10% decline in inter-state border frictions has sizable welfare gains ranging from
1% in some districts to as high as 8% in others. Moreover, over half of the variation in
changes in firms’ sales to other firms can be explained by endogenous changes in the
network structure.
The framework developed here can be directly applied to answer questions that could
be broadly classified asmarket integration, technology improvements, and improvement
in allocative efficiency; nevertheless, it can serve as a fertile baseline model to answer
a wider variety of questions where changes in the production network across firms can
lead to aggregate consequences. In pursuit of parsimonious parametrization, the model
abstracts from several realistic features of the network economy such as sectoral het-
erogeneity in technological requirements, supply chain dynamics, industry dynamics
of entry and exit, heterogeneous search frictions, and richer bargaining environment
between buyers and suppliers all of which are potential avenues for future research.
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Online Appendix
Appendix A. Data & Empirical Regularities: Appendix
A.1. Margins of Firms’ Sales. Similar to Equation 2.1, I construct a decomposition
of firms’ destination-specific sales as:
input salesod(s)=











where input salesod(s) denotes input sales of firm s to customers at d andNod(s) denotes
the number of customers of s who are located at d. Table A.1 provides results of this
decomposition under different specifications.
A.2. Margins of Intranational Trade. Trade flows between Indian districts aggre-
gated from firm-to-firm sales show that districts within the same state are more likely
to trade than those across states. Among all possible pairs of districts, around 40% do
not trade at all. For district pairs that trade with each other, I construct the following
decomposition of trade flows into four factors:
salesod=


























b∈Md salesod(s, b), Nod denotes the sellers from o that sell
at d. In this decomposition, the first three margins capture the role of the upstream
margin whereas the third margin captures the role of the downstreammargin in driving
differences in aggregate trade flows. In considering this decomposition, I depart from
the trade literature where these margins are regrouped such that the first margin is
called the extensive margin of trade defined as the number of firms from o that sell at
d and the remaining three margins are together called the intensive margin of trade
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Table A.1. Margins of Firms’ Sales: Contribution to Total
Variance
Sales Destination-Specific Sales
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Customers 35% 36% 37% 23% 22%
Intensity per Customer 46% 46% 57% 57% 59%
Average Customer Size 19% 18% 6% 20% 19%
Fixed Effects:
Seller×Year — — X — —
Origin×Year — X — — X
Destination×Year — — — — X
Data Level:
Seller×Year • • — — —
Seller×Destination×Year — — • • •
# observations 5.6×106 5.6×106 18.2×106 18.2×106 18.2×106
Note. Columns (1) and (2) report the contribution of factors: # customers,
intensity per customer, and average customer size, to the variance of firms’ sales as
per equation (2.1). Column (3), (4), and (5) report the contribution of those factors
to the variance of firms’ destination-specific sales as per equation (A.1).
average sales across the firms from o that enter d. 26 This is so as to emphasize the
role of endogenous network formation and cross-border supply chains in determining
aggregate trade flows. Table A.2 reports the results from this decomposition.
Appendix B. Theoretical Framework: Appendix
B.1. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2.
B.1.1. Joint Distribution of the Lowest and the Second Lowest Effective Costs. We be-
gin by characterizing the joint distribution of the lowest and second lowest effective cost









so, we evaluate the probability with which b receives exactly one offer with an effective
cost no greater than p(1) and no other offers less than p(2)(>p(1)). The lowest cost offer
p(1) can be from any one of the locations in J . We evaluate the probability with which
this offer is from any given location o and sum it across all locations. The probability
with which b receives one offer with an effective cost no greater than p(1) from o and no
other offers less than p(2) across all locations is given by:
26For example, see Eaton et al. (2011) and Fernandes et al. (2018) for such decomposition of the
margins of international trade between countries where it is documented that the extensive margin
accounts for over half the variation in trade flows between countries.
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Table A.2. Margins of Intranational Trade: Contribution to
Total Variance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
# Sellers 59% 57% 61% 58%
# Customers per Seller 8% 9% 8% 10%
Intensity per Customer 20% 20% 24% 26%
Average Customer Size 13% 13% 7% 6%
Fixed Effects:
Origin×Year — X — X
Destination×Year — — X X
Data Level:
Origin×Destination×Year • • • •
# observations 58,390 58,390 58,390 58,390
# dropped observations (zeros) 41,015 41,015 41,015 41,015
# district pairs 1412×5 1412×5 1412×5 1412×5
Note. This table reports the contribution of factors: # sellers, # customers per
seller, intensity per customer, and average customer size, to the variance of trade


















































































Under Assumption 5, the probability with which b encounters exactly one supplier
who can deliver at a cost no greater than p(1) and encounters no other suppliers with



























































































































B.1.2. Distribution of Effective Prices. We derive an expression for Fpd(p), that is, the
probability with which any firm b located in d faces an effective price no greater than p
for one of its tasks k. Firm b faces an effective price no greater than p if the second-lowest
























































































































It can be similarly shown that effective prices for needs faced by households is also
given by Fpd (·) The following lemma states that the above fixed point problem that
solves for market access is well-defined in the sense that it admits a unique positive
solution. The proof strategy follows from Allen et al. (2020).



























(1) has at least one positive solution
(2) has at most one positive solution (up to scale)
(3) the unique solution can be computed as the limit of a simple iterative procedure.
Proof. First, I establish existence of positive solution to the system of equations. Define









′. Note that all com-
ponents ofRod are positive and finite. Then, by construction, for any d, not allRods are

























follows that T (A)0. Note thatA is closed and bounded. SinceA⊂RJ++, this implies
that A is compact. Further, A is non-empty and convex, and T is continuous. Then,
by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, T (•) has a fixed point. This establishes existence of
a solution the system of equations.
To establish uniqueness, let’s suppose by way of contradiction that the system of
equations has two different solutions A(0),A(1) that are not linear transformations of














. Notice that ā
a
≥1. Thus the system
























































































Similarly, we can show that a≥1. This implies that ā
a
≤1. But by construction ā
a
≥1.
Therefore, it must be the case that a
a
=1 or A(0) =A(1). This establishes uniqueness.
Next, I show that the solution to the system of equations can be obtained via a simple
iterative procedure. Starting from any strictly positive A(0), we construct a sequence
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Similarly, we can show that a
(t)
(a(t−1))






























≥ 1∀t, this implies that limt→∞ ā
(t)
a(t)
= 1. That is, the solution can be
computed as the limit of a simple iterative procedure. 






























B.3. Proof of Proposition 3.
Corollary 1. The distribution of idiosyncratic productivities of firms at location o






























The results then follow from Lemma 1. 
Corollary 2. The distribution of effective price faced by firms at location d satisfies







































The results then follow from Lemma 2. 























































































B.4. Proof of Proposition 4.
B.4.1. Proof of Equation (3.11). Consider a pair of firms s located in o and b located
in d. Now, suppose the marginal cost of firm s from o and it’s cost of shipping goods
to d are co(s) and τod respectively. For any task k and match-specific productivity
aod(s,b,k) = a, the effective cost incurred by s of delivering its goods for task k by b
is co(s)τod
a
. Supplier s is selected by b for task k if b encounters s with match-specific
productivity a and b does not encounter any other supplier for whom it is effectively
less costly to deliver the good (including the event that bmeets s and the match-specific
productivity realized is higher than a). The probability with which b selects s for any





































Since λ = o(M), considering λ
M
 1 and using the approximation ln(1+x)≈ x for








































































































































Here, in the fifth line we utilize Assumption 5 which implies that in sufficiently














od(s,b,k). Further, since π0od(s,b) is independent of the identity of the buyer
at any location d, we write π0od(s,−)=π0od(s,b).
B.4.2. Proof of Equation (3.12). The probability with which a firm s located in o is
selected by any given firm at d for at least one of its tasks is given by:
































B.5. Proof of Proposition 5.
B.5.1. Proof of Equation (3.13). The probability with which any firm at d sources from






























































B.5.2. Proof of Equation (3.14). The probability with which any firm at d sources at
least one task from o is given by:











































B.6. Proof of Proposition 6. For any realization of σ, labor demand by firm b at d



































































































(3) Final Consumption Demand








































































































































































































































































together we can further simplify the goods market clearing condition to obtain the
































Since {wd(σ)}d solves the above system of equations for a given realization of σ0, irre-
spective of the realization of σ1, we conclude that wd(σ)=wd(σ0). That is, {wd :d∈J }










Appendix C. Empirical Framework: Appendix
C.1. Proof of Proposition 7. In our context, the multinomial random variable
counts the number of successes in each of theM categories (one for each other supplier
s), afterKd(b) independent trials (one for each task associated with b). Let π0od(s,b) de-
note the probability of success andKod(s,b) denote the number of successes in category




















s∈MoKod(s,b) =Kd(b). From assumption






























The likelihood for the complete sample,K≡{Kod(s,b) : (s,b)∈Mo×Md,(o,d)∈J ×J }

























































































































































































































































C.2. Estimation of Structural Elasticities, Θ.
C.2.1. Trade Elasticity ζ. Since the model satisfies structural gravity at the aggregate
level (see Equation (3.13)) and the dispersion of match-specific productivities ζ coin-
cides with the elasticity of trade with respect to trade costs, I calibrate the value of this
parameter to 5 from median of the estimates of price elasticity in structural gravity
equations (see Head and Mayer (2014)).
C.2.2. Materials Share α. The distribution of markups from Proposition 2 provides
expressions for value-added share of gross output (V A/GO)o. Using equation (3.8),
materials share αo is calibrated as αo=(1+1/ζ)(1−(V A/GO)o), where (V A/GO)o across
districts are constructed using aggregate production statistics as follows.
I obtain district-level sectoral GDP {V Ajo} from Nielsen Analytics, a private data
firm and industry-level data on value-added share of gross output at the national level,{
(V A/GO)j :j∈I
}
from the World Input-Output Database. Using these, I construct a










I use data pertaining to six industry groups for this calculation. They are (a) Mining
and Quarrying; (b) Construction; (c) Manufacturing; (d) Electricity, Gas and Water
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Supply; (e) Transport, Storage and Communication; and (f) Trade, Hotels and Restau-
rants.
C.2.3. Task Intensities κ. Estimation of task intensities κ relies on equation (3.12).
The expression for ρ0od (s,−) shows how κd regulates the number of customers a firm
s finds at location d given its conditional choice probabilities π0od(s,−). Since both
ρ0od (s,−) and π0od(s,−) are independent of the identity of buyer at d, the empirical
counterpart of ρ0od(s,−) is the fraction of firms at d that buy goods from s. The theo-
retical value of ρ0od(s,−) in terms of κd is computed using estimated conditional choice
probabilities π∗od(s,−). Estimates of task intensities κ are obtained by minimizing the
distance between theoretical and empirical values of ρ0od(s,−).
C.2.4. Productivity Dispersion θ. The theoretical expression for the squared coefficient




























For any value of θ, the theoretical value is evaluated using estimates of task intensities
κ and materials shares α, as per the above expression. For each district, the empirical
value of the squared coefficient of variation is obtained using the estimator proposed
in Breunig (2001) from estimates
{(
co(s)
−ζ)∗ :s∈M}. Estimates of θ are obtained by
minimizing the distance between the theoretical and the empirical values of squared
coefficient of variation.
C.3. Expected Utility &Welfare Changes. Households residing at location d are
heterogeneous both in their numbers of needs and match-specific taste shocks of using
different suppliers’ goods to fulfill their needs. Welfare at any location is then calcu-
lated in expectation. That is, Vd=E[Vd(·)]. With Cobb-Douglas utilities across needs,


















































Welfare changes, i.e., changes in expected indirect utility at location d in response to




where ŵd denotes the change in wage and Âd denotes change in market access at d.
C.4. Procedure forComputingCounterfactualOutcomes. Counterfactual anal-
ysis is conducted in three steps. First, I evaluate the expected value of aggregate and
firm-level outcomes in the initial state. Second, I compute changes in aggregate out-
comes that result from the counterfactual shock. Finally, I evaluate the expected value
of aggregate and firm-level outcomes in the counterfactual state
Step 1: Compute expected value of aggregate and firm-level outcomes in initial state.











where π∗od(•,−) is calculated as in equation (4.7). Using the solution to these equations,














where (V A/GO)d for district d is calculated in equation (C.1). Total value-added across
all districts is chosen as the numeraire, i.e.,
∑
dV Ad=1. At the firm-level, input sales,

















where π∗od(s,−) is calculated as in equation (4.6).
Step 2: Evaluate change in aggregate outcomes from initial to counterfactual state.
For any change in σ0, δ̂ ≡
{
δ̂od : (o,d)∈J ×J
}
, one can solve for change in wages
ŵ≡{ŵd :d∈J } with the following tâtonnement algorithm for some positive constant
µ and tolerance value tol:
(1) Start with a guess for the vector of change in wages, ŵ(0)
(2) For the vector of wage changes, in the tth iteration ŵ(t), compute change in






































































(6) If ‖ŵ(t+1)−ŵ(t)‖>tol, go back to (2), else end.
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Step 3: Compute expected value of aggregate and firm-level outcomes in counterfactual
state. As in the initial state, here again V A′d and GO′d are computed for each district





























































od (•,−) and δ̂od(s) is the firm-level shock
from the change in σ0.
C.5. Estimation Results. This section first goes over estimates of trade frictions
and conditional choice probabilities, and then model predictions for firms’ sales and
intensity of use.28 Then, I evaluate the model by seeing how well it replicates empirical
regularities documented in Section 2.
C.5.1. Estimates. Trade frictions are estimated using gravity regressions. Table C.1
reports estimated coefficients for distance and border dummies in column (4) and com-
pares them to common methods in the trade literature in columns (1)-(3). Column
(1) is an atheoretical regression specification that is not appealing when there are ze-
ros in trade data and hence not comparable to other columns. Column (2) is still an
atheoretical specification but is consistent with handling zeros in the data. Column
(3) is a model-based specification and accommodates zeros in the data. Column (4)
28Estimates of elasticities contained in Θ are relegated to Appendix C.5.
68
is the specification that is implied by the model here. Comparing (2) or (3) to (4)
shows that using aggregate trade flows or shares underestimates trade frictions for
estimation of the model here. With estimated trade frictions in hand, estimates of
sourcing probabilities, denoted by π∗od(•,−), and firms’ conditional choice probabili-
ties across destinations, denoted by π∗od(s,−), are obtained using equations (4.7) and
(4.6). I solve for wages that satisfy the trade equilibrium in the limiting economy using
equation (3.16) with the estimated sourcing probabilities. The expected value of firms’
destination-specific intensity of use and sales are respectively calculated, using wages












Intensity of use and sales of any given firmare then computed by summing over the above
values across all destinations. For aggregate trade flows between an origin-destination
pair, corresponding values are obtained by summing over all firms at the origin.
C.5.2. Model Fit. A key finding in Proposition 7 is that the fixed effect estimate for
a firm s with the multinomial likelihood specification is in fact its measured intensity
of use,
∑
dπod(s,•).29 According to the model (in equation (3.11)), this fixed effect is
related marginal costs as co(s)−ζ . This directly features in equation (4.6) and plays a
vital role in enabling themodel to reproduce the empirical regularities. Apart from this,
goodness of fit is governed by four factors. First, imperfect correlation between data
and fitted values in Table C.1, Column (4) causes differences in πod(•,−) and π∗od(•,−).
Second, estimating equation (4.1) is parsimoniously specified as it does not allow het-
erogeneity in trade frictions faced by firms. While the data is at the firm-to-firm level,
fixed effects are only at the firm and origin–destination level. Third, equilibrium wages
computed for the limiting economy differ from data. These differences capture the
granularity of data which are assumed away in the limiting economy. Finally, estimates
of material share of costsα and dispersion in match-specific productivities ζ also affect
predicted values calculated via equation (C.3).
29Fixed effect for firm s is the product of the within location component c̃o(s)−ζ and the between
location component c−ζo . Equation (4.3) provides a estimator for the former. The latter is estimated in
column (4) in Table C.1 using a multinomial likelihood specification. By properties of the multinomial
likelihood, this estimate is given by
∑
dπod(•,•). Together, they imply that the fixed effect estimate





Estimates of intensity of use are only affected by the first two factors whereas those
of sales are affected by all of them. Columns (1) and (3) in Table C.2 report the coef-
ficient of determination of log-log regressions where observed values are projected on
predicted values of intensity of use and sales. Average customer size is omitted from
this table because it is obtained as the ratio of sales and intensity of use and so it is
not meaningful to measure its goodness of fit. Columns (2) and (4) in Table C.2 report
similar results but using average trade shares observed in data πod(•,−) instead of the
corresponding fitted values π∗od(•,−) for sourcing probabilities. These columns help
assess the loss of fit arising from gravity regressions. These results suggest that (a) fits
for sales are worse than intensity of use due to the third and fourth factors, (b) fits for
firms’ destination-specific sales are the worse than firms’ overall sales due to the second
factor, (c) fit of gravity regressions causes substantial loss of fit only for aggregate trade
flows due to the first factor.
Table C.3 reports how the estimated model performs in comparison to the empirical
regularities documented in Section 2. I focus only on the upstream (intensity of use)
and downstream (average customer size) margins and not the three-way decomposition
in Section 2. This is because the model does not meaningfully differentiate between the
first and second factors in expectation and further, it is the joint contribution of both
these factors that plays a role in endogenous network formation. Table C.3 shows that
the intensity of use margin explains a vast majority of the variation in firms’ sales in
the estimated model as is the case in the data. This is true across all columns in the
data qualitatively. Quantitatively, all columns except (3) provide a reasonably good
fit. In column (3), the loss of fit can be attributed to the second factor.
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(1): OLS (2): PPML (3): MPML (4): MPML
log(distance) -2.947∗∗∗ -0.219∗∗∗ -0.712∗∗∗ -0.990∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044)
1{inter-state} -5.032∗∗∗ -1.971∗∗∗ -2.125∗∗∗ -2.579∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.104) (0.090) (0.089)
1{inter-district} 0.086 -1.484∗∗∗ -1.852∗∗∗ -2.262∗∗∗
(0.215) (0.117) (0.078) (0.067)
1{neighbor} -1.121∗∗∗ 0.562∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.516∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.053) (0.052) (0.047)
Fixed Effects:
Origin × Year X X X X
Destination × Year X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.669 — — —
Pseudo R2 — 0.945 0.435 0.488
Squared Correlation 0.674 0.953 0.793 0.898
# observations 1412×5 1412×5 1412×5 1412×5
Note. Standard errors in parentheses, two-way clustered by origin–year and
destination–year. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001. Observations pertain to all
bilateral pairs between 141 districts for 5 years. The distance between district pairs
is calculated as the distance between their centroids. A district’s distance to itself is
calculated as the radius of the circle with the same area as the district. Column (1) is
estimated using an OLS specification with the inverse hyperbolic sine of trade flows as
dependent variable. Column (2) is estimated using a Poisson PML specification with
aggregate trade flows as the dependent variable as in Santos Silva andTenreyro (2006).
Column (3) is estimated using a multinomial PML specification with aggregate trade
shares as the dependent variable as in Eaton et al. (2013). Column (4) is estimated
using a multinomial PML specification from equation (4.5). Two-way clustering is
done as in Cameron et al. (2011). Pseudo R2 is calculated as in McFadden (1974).
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Table C.2. Goodness of Fit: Firms’ Intensity of Use and Sales
Intensity of Use Overall
π∗od(•,−) πod(•,−) π∗od(•,−) πod(•,−)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sales 0.996 1.000 0.428 0.467
Destination-Specific Sales 0.324 0.381 0.176 0.186
Trade Flows 0.512 0.999 0.503 0.709
Note. This table reportsR2 of log-log regressions when predicted values for intensity
of use and sales are projected on observed data at three levels of aggregation: firms’
destination-specific sales, firms’ sales, and aggregate trade flows. Columns (1) and
(3) use estimated average trade shares from equation (4.7) while (2) and (4) use
exact average trade share from equation (4.4) for the calculations.
Table C.3. Model Fit: Margins of Firms’ Sales
Sales Destination-Specific Sales Trade Flows
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Data:
Intensity of Use 81% 82% 94% 80% 87% 94%
Average Customer Size 19% 18% 6% 20% 13% 6%
Model:
Intensity of Use 73% 100% 61% 76% 71% 100%
Average Customer Size 27% 0% 39% 24% 29% 0%
Fixed Effects:
Seller×Year — — X — — —
Origin×Year — X — — — X
Destination×Year — — — — — X
Data Level:
Seller×Year • • — — — —
Seller×Destination×Year — — • • — —
Origin×Destination×Year — — — — • •
# observations 5.6×106 5.6×106 18.2×106 18.2×106 58,390 58,390
Note. Columns (1) and (2) report the contribution of factors: intensity of use and
average customer size, to the variance of firms’ sales (as per equation (2.1)) in the
data (top panel) and in the model (bottom panel). Columns (3) and (4) report the
contribution of those factors to the variance of firms’ destination-specific sales (as
per equation (A.1)). Columns (5) and (6) report the same for trade flows between
districts (as per equation (A.2)).
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Supplementary Material
Appendix D. Data & Empirical Regularities: Supplementary Material
D.1. Summary Statistics. Table D.1 reports count statistics of firms and relation-
ships between them each year accompanied by their breakdown into different categories.
Figure D.1 plots the spatial distribution of firm–year pairs across districts on their re-
spective state maps. Figure D.2 plots the distribution of firm-to-firm relationships
across district pairs. Table D.2 reports distributions of firms’ sales to other firms, #
customers, and sales per customer. Table D.3 reports distributions of firms’ purchases
from other firms, # suppliers, and purchases per supplier.
D.2. Margins of Firms’ Sales. The joint distribution of firms’ sales with intensity
of use and average customer size is depicted in Figure D.3. Figure D.4 provides the
results of decomposition of firms’ sales by district. Figure D.5 provides the results of
decomposition of firms’ sales by percentile bins.
D.3. Margins of Intranational Trade. The overall level of trade integration be-
tween districts as measured by the Head and Ries (2001) index is depicted in Figure
D.6.30 Figure D.7 depicts the breakdown of trade flows across district pairs into the
upstream and downstream margins.











Note. Districts are shaded by # firm–year observations (from columns (1–5) in
Table D.1, middle panel). Darker shades reflect lower values. Relative areal extent
of states is not up to scale. 74
Figure D.2. Distribution of Firm-to-Firm Relationships across
District Pairs

































Note. This figure depicts the 141×141 matrix of # relationships between district
pairs in 2015-2016 (from column (5) in Table D.1, bottom panel). Darker cells reflect
higher values. Districts are arranged first by state and then alphabetically within
states on both axes.
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Note. In this figure, firms are classified into 100×100 bins based on their total sales
in input markets and intensity of use (left panel) or average customer size (right
panel). This is a two-dimensional histogram where each cell in this 100×100 matrix
is shaded as per the quantile of the count of firms in the bin such that darker shades
correspond to higher quantiles.
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Table D.1. Summary Statistics: Firms and their Relationships
2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 2014-2015 2015-2016 All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
# Firms 1,616 1,743 1,899 2,040 2,107 2,572
Neither 23% 25% 24% 24% 24% 18%
Buy 16% 16% 16% 18% 18% 15%
Sell 19% 17% 17% 15% 14% 17%
Both 42% 42% 43% 43% 43% 50%
Gujarat 21% 21% 22% 24% 24% 25%
Maharashtra 42% 41% 40% 38% 36% 34%
Odisha 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 6%
Tamil Nadu 24% 25% 25% 25% 25% 27%
West Bengal 8% 8% 8% 8% 9% 8%
# Relationships 17,681 18,547 21,031 22,600 23,786 103,646
Intra-District 58% 57% 57% 58% 57% 58%
Inter-District 37% 38% 38% 38% 39% 38%
Inter-State 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4%
Note. Figures for # firms and # relationships are in units of thousands. Columns
(1–5) report values for each year and column (6) the total across all years. The top
panel breaks down # firms by their participation in the network, i.e., whether they
buy from and sell to other firms. The middle panel breaks down firms by the state in
which they are located. The bottom panel reports the breakdown of # relationships
based on whether the customer and supplier are located in the same district, different
districts or different states altogether. For the top and middle panels, column (6)
reports statistics pertaining to unique firms across all years. For the bottom panel,
column (6) reports the sum of columns (1–5).
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Table D.2. Summary Statistics: Firms’ Customers and Sales
Percentile: 90 75 50 25 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Customers:
2011-2012 39 14 4 2 1
2012-2013 39 14 4 2 1
2013-2014 41 15 5 2 1
2014-2015 42 15 5 2 1
2015-2016 44 15 5 2 1
Sales per Customer:
2011-2012 1,850 536 153 44 13
2012-2013 1,993 570 162 47 14
2013-2014 2,027 577 165 49 14
2014-2015 2,160 609 171 50 14
2015-2016 2,121 610 174 51 14
Sales to other Firms:
2011-2012 18,620 4,606 987 158 25
2012-2013 19,702 4,882 1,037 167 26
2013-2014 21,225 5,199 1,095 175 27
2014-2015 22,531 5,517 1,143 177 27
2015-2016 22,936 5,690 1,184 183 27
Note. For each year and for firms that sell to other firms, the top panel reports the
median, top and bottom deciles, and upper and lower quartiles of # customers. The
middle panel reports the same for sales per customer and the bottom panel for sales
to other firms. All sales figures are reported in units of 1000 INR.
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Table D.3. Summary Statistics: Firms’ Suppliers and Purchases
Percentile: 90 75 50 25 10
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Suppliers:
2011-2012 46 21 8 3 1
2012-2013 44 20 8 3 1
2013-2014 45 21 8 3 1
2014-2015 43 20 8 3 1
2015-2016 44 21 8 3 1
Purchases per Supplier:
2011-2012 2,628 752 228 77 30
2012-2013 2,871 811 243 81 32
2013-2014 2,978 841 251 84 33
2014-2015 2,983 845 249 83 33
2015-2016 2,941 835 249 84 33
Purchases from other Firms:
2011-2012 28,005 7,822 2,182 575 150
2012-2013 29,137 8,067 2,252 589 152
2013-2014 31,825 8,826 2,410 630 163
2014-2015 30,445 8,311 2,318 614 159
2015-2016 31,136 8,506 2,403 633 164
Note. For each year and for firms that purchase fromother firms, the toppanel reports
the median, top and bottom deciles, and upper and lower quartiles of # suppliers.
Themiddle panel reports the same for purchases per supplier and the bottompanel for
purchases from other firms. All purchases figures are reported in units of 1000 INR.
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Figure D.4. Margins of Firms’ Sales: Contribution toVariance,
by District






















Contribution to Total Variance
Note. For firms grouped by district–year, the contribution of factors: # customers,
intensity per customer, and average customer size, to the variance of firms’ sales
was calculated as per equation (2.1). This figure is a box and whiskers plot of the
contribution of these factors across districts arranged in a state×year grid.
79





















# Customers Intensity per Customer Average Customer Size
Note. For firms grouped into 100 equal-sized bins, the contribution of factors: #
customers, intensity per customer, and average customer size, to the variance of
firms’ sales was calculated as per equation (2.1). This figure is a smoothed regression
plot of the contribution of these factors across those bins.
Figure D.6. Margins of Intranational Trade: Trade Integration
between Districts
Gujarat Maharashtra Odisha Tamil Nadu West Bengal
Note. This figure depicts the (symmetric) 141×141 matrix of Head and Ries (2001)
indexes of district pairs where cells with higher values are shaded darker. Districts
are first ordered by state and then alphabetically within each state. Blocks along
the diagonal depict values for intra-state district pairs while other areas depict
inter-state district pairs.
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Figure D.7. Margins of Intranational Trade: Upstream &
Downstream Margins






































































































Note. Across district pairs, the top left panel depicts the 141×141matrix of intensity
of use (i.e., the upstream margin), the top right depicts average customer size (i.e.,
the downstream margin), and the bottom depicts trade flows or sales from origin to
destination. Darker cells reflect higher values. Districts are arranged first by state
and then alphabetically within states on both axes. All values pertain to 2015-2016.
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Appendix E. Theoretical Framework: Supplementary Material
E.1. Some Properties of Extreme Value Distributions.












where γ is the Euler-Mascheroni constant, π is Archimedes’ constant, and ζ(3) is the
Apéry constant.


































































Appendix F. Empirical Framework: Supplementary Material
For each district, Figure F.1 presents estimates of material share of costs across
districts. For each district–year pair, Figure F.2 presents estimates of shape parame-
ters of Fréchet distribution of productivities and Figure F.3 presents estimates of task
intensities of zero-truncated Poisson distribution of numbers of tasks.
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Note. The left panel is a histogram of estimated material share of costs across
districts. The right panel is a box and whiskers plot of estimated material share
of costs across districts within each state. States are arranged by economic size in
descending order.
































Note. The left panel is a stacked histogram of estimated shape parameter of
Fréchet distributions of firms’ productivities, across districts (from Assumption
(1)). The right panel is a box and whiskers plot of the estimated shape parameters
across district–year pairs within each state. States are arranged by economic size in
descending order.
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Note. The left panel is a stacked histogram of estimated task intensities of
zero-truncated Poisson distributions of firms’ numbers of tasks, across districts
(from Assumption (2)). The right panel is a box and whiskers plot of the estimated
task intensities across district–year pairs within each state. States are arranged by
economic size in descending order.
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